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Abstract
This cumulative doctoral thesis comprises three essays in which “Data En-
velopment Analysis” (DEA), an instructive and flexible analytic tool with
origins in operations research, is utilized to help clarify three crucial issues
that arise when subjecting network industries to price-cap regulation. These
issues are: First, the relationship of price-cap regulation with investment,
second, the relationship of price-cap regulation with quality and third, the
correct cost of capital within price-cap regulation. Without loss of generality,
the investigation is focused on the case of electricity.
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation umfasst drei Arbeiten, in denen
mit Hilfe der “Data Envelopment Analysis” (DEA), einer praktischen und
flexiblen Methode mit Wurzeln im Operations Research, versucht wird, zur
Kla¨rung von drei entscheidenden Fragen beizutragen, die sich bei der weit-
gehend zum Standard gewordenen Price-Cap Regulierung ergeben. Diese
Fragen sind: Erstens, das Verha¨ltnis von Price-Cap Regulierung zu Inves-
titionen, zweitens, das Verha¨ltnis von Price-Cap Regulierung zu Qualita¨t
und drittens, die richtige Ho¨he der Kapitalkosten bei Price-Cap Regulie-
rung. Ohne Beschra¨nkung der Allgemeinheit konzentriert sich die Analyse
dabei auf die Elektrizita¨tswirtschaft.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Liberalizing network utilities: The neces-
sity of regulation
According to the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics competition
is a conditio sine qua non for a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources (cf.
for example Katz and Rosen, 1998, p. 389 f.).
As a corollary, “liberalization”, i.e. the abolition of entry-barriers to areas
of activity that used to be legally or habitually reserved to the incumbent
monopolist in order to enable competition (Waterson, 1988, p. 122), is a
prerequisite for attaining a welfare maximum.
Despite this theoretical advisability of liberalization, it can be problematic
in less abstract settings; not only from political or moral points of views1,
which are not considered here, but also from a purely economic stance. This
is particularly true for such industries as telecommunications, the postal
services, the railways and electricity where a stage of production is a so-called
“natural monopoly” where “over the range of the relevant output levels,
a single firm can produce the total industry output at less cost than can
any greater number of firms” (Katz and Rosen, 1998, p. 432) and thus
competition is inhibited per definition. Whereas, therefore, the other stages
1Cf. politicians’ sympathy for a nationalized steel monopoly to preserve jobs or the
need to assess the utility of health when liberalizing the health care sector.
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of production in these industries can be liberalized without problems and
thus a “first best” (theoretically) be achieved, this is not possible with these
networks of telephone-cables, post-offices, railway-tracks and electricity-lines,
such that at most a so-called “second best” (i.e. the least deviation from the
allocatively efficient competitive outcome that assures the survival of the
monopolist) can be aimed at here.
This goal can be reached through “regulation” in the sense of “rules issued for
the purpose of controlling the manner in which private and public enterprises
conduct their operations” (Majone, 1996, p. 9). In principle, there are two
possible modes of regulation: public ownership and statutory regulation of a
private monopoly by independent agencies. Historically, the first mode has
been favored in Europe whereas the latter one has been predominant in the
US. Even though both forms can theoretically lead to similar inefficiencies
(see Majone, 1996, p. 18), the widespread failure of public ownership as a
mode of regulation in Europe has lead to an increasing dissemination of the
latter version of regulation here too. Accordingly, the following discussion
will be based on this case.
1.2 Types of regulation
When trying to achieve the second best outcome, the regulatory agency max-
imizes a weighted average of consumer surplus and the rent (or net profit)
secured by the regulated firm (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, Chapter 2).
The principal problem that arises here and that is the main inefficiency-source
of all regulation, is that the regulator typically has less information than the
regulated firm about such key industry data as consumer demand or the fun-
damental technological capabilities. In order to overcome this problem a few
“optimal regulatory policies” (cf. Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, p. 1562
f.) have been developed that model formally and “determine precisely how
the regulator optimally pursues his goals in the presence of this asymmetry”
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, p. 1606). Unfortunately “these models
seldom capture the full richness of the settings in which actual regulatory
policies are implemented” (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, p. 1606) and
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
therefore are not directly applicable in practice.
This has led researchers and practitioners to propose a few pragmatic regu-
latory policies that circumvent the information-problem by trying to achieve
particular situation-dependent regulatory goals instead of being generally op-
timal. In retrospective, roughly two main such goals of regulatory practice—
also reflecting a different weighting of consumer and producer surplus—can
be identified: First, the buildup of infrastructure or a secure return on in-
vestment and second, the reduction of productive inefficiencies. The corre-
sponding paradigmatic policies are “rate of return”(ROR) and “price-cap”
(aka “RPI-X”) regulation.
1.2.1 Rate of Return regulation
Under ROR regulation “the regulator sets prices for the utility in such a way
that they cover the utility’s cost of production and include a rate of return
on capital that is sufficient to maintain investors’ willingness to replace or
expand the company’s assets” (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 225). It is clear,
that in such a regime the firm has no incentive what so ever to reduce its
cost and that the significant risk of the usually big infrastructure projects in
these industries is largely eliminated. This regime, or adaptations to it, was
predominant in the US until a decade or so.
1.2.2 Price-cap regulation
Under price-cap regulation, on the other hand, a trajectory of prices for
the firm’s products is set for some period in the future (e.g. the next 5
years), requiring them, for example, to decline by 3 per cent per year in real
terms (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 226). In fact, the regime permits an
increase of a firm’s level of prices in accordance with overall inflation (the
retail price index = RPI) less an increase in productive efficiency (X) that the
regulator deems adequate. This way, the firm has a strong incentive to cut
its cost, as all cost savings are immediately reflected by a higher profit. Its
incentives to invest, however, become very small as the long term beneficial
effects of a better infrastructure are ignored. Along with the increasing waves
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
of liberalization of network utilities that have swept through Europe since
the beginning of the 1980, this regulation regime, developed by Littlechild
(1983) for the privatization of British Telecom, has become so popular that
it is practically the standard not only here (cf. Research, 2006) but also in
the US today. This is due to the fact that one of the main motivations for
liberalization in Europe was specifically the hope that it would come along
with more efficient enterprises such that pressure from public finances would
be relieved. Moreover, price-cap regulation is relatively simple to implement
and provides enterprises with a more reliable planning-basis than, say, ROR
regulation, since the room for regulatory discretion is reduced.
1.3 The research agenda
Despite the merits of price-cap regulation and its widespread popularity, it is,
as already mentioned above, explicitly not an optimal regulatory policy such
that the principal question arises, whether the achievement of its primary
goal—increased productive efficiency of the regulated entities—might come
at the cost of other important determinants of welfare.
It is exactly the answering of this question that sets the agenda for further
research. More specifically, three intertwined issues need to be clarified:
• The relationship of price-cap regulation with investment.
• The relationship of price-cap regulation with quality.
• The correct cost of capital within price-cap regulation.
When trying to tackle the above research-topics, a point to start with, is
to recall that one of the most important tasks of regulators in a price-cap
regime is to assess the efficiency of the regulated enterprises as objectively
and impartially as possible in order to be able to prescribe fair individual
productivity gains that the enterprises have to achieve in the upcoming reg-
ulatory period.
To that end a few parametric and non-parametric methods have been em-
ployed. A very popular and instructive non-parametric approach is Data
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as pioneered by Charnes et al. (1978). The
merit of DEA is that it specifies an efficient frontier without the need for
the definition of a production function by laying a convex hull around the
empirically available input-output combinations of the players in the sam-
ple. Following Farrell’s pioneering approach (Farrell, 1957) efficiency of the
respective enterprise is then usually measured by the distance between the
observation and the estimated ideal on the efficient frontier.
Apart from the application of DEA by diverse regulatory agencies, it has
practically and theoretically been utilized to analyse all sorts of problems
and has indeed proven to be a very flexible and helpful analytic tool (cf. for
example Cooper et al., 2000).
Given the merits and flexibility of DEA, the aim of this dissertation-project
was to find and use suitable variations of the original concept to help clarify
each of the above identified research topics, where without loss of generality
(concerning the other network industries) the investigation was to be focused
on electricity.
The result of this endeavor are the three papers that form chapters 2-4 of
this cumulative dissertation and since—as will be outlined below—each of
them takes up the DEA-concept, adapts it creatively and applies it empir-
ically to make a contribution to one of the above issues, the goal of this
dissertation-project has indeed been attained.
1.4 Method
More specifically, in order to help clarify the first research issue, in the first
paper a dynamic DEA-model is developed and applied to the data of 50 of the
largest US transmission system operators between 2000 and 2006. By com-
paring these results with those of a conventional static model, the hypothesis
is tested that the static models that are usually employed by regulators when
setting up a price-cap regime can lead to wrong conclusions about about the
enterprises’ efficiency and thus about the optimal level of investment.
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In the second paper—co-authored with Anton Burger2—the case of Norway
is investigated, one of the first countries where quality regulation was ex-
plicitly incorporated in the price cap regime. Here, theoretically sufficient
conditions of a welfare increase due to quality regulation are derived and it
is shown how these can be checked empirically by means of a DEA-based
decomposition of so called cost Malmquist-indices. This is done in order to
answer the important question of whether and in how far quality regulation
can increase welfare in the wake of such undesired developments as blackouts
and plummeting customer satisfaction with the quality of service and thus
to shed more light on the second research issue.
Aiming to clarify the third research issue, in the third paper a DEA-technique
is developed by which the credit default risk of entire industries can be com-
pared. This method is applied to European samples of 22 electricity- and
20 telecom service providers to answer the difficult question of regulators
whether the electricity industry has a lower weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) than the telecom industry.
1.5 The contribution of this dissertation
Conceptually the contribution of this dissertation is twofold: First, it shall
help to clarify important issues that arise with price-cap regulation and sec-
ond, its unorthodox applications of DEA shall provide further evidence for
the great flexibility of this method.
In particular, the following can be stated:
Concerning the relationship between price-cap regulation and in-
vestment: The usually applied static DEA-model doesn’t acknowledge the
efficiency enhancing effects of quasi-fixed inputs as much as the dynamic
model. A sole reliance of regulators on such a static model might therefore
indeed mislead enterprises to increase their efficiency by cutting down in-
2Research Institute for Regulatory Economics, Vienna University of Economics and
Business Administration, e-mail: anton.burger@wu-wien.ac.at
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vestment in their transmission lines and transformer capacity. Bearing in
mind that these quasi-fixed inputs are essential for reliable and high-quality
electricity supply, it becomes clear that this would have very undesirable
consequences. In other words: Especially regulators who are interested in
whether the enterprises under scrutiny employ efficient amounts of capital
inputs should definitely have a look at dynamic efficiencies and not rely on
a static efficiency analysis only.
Concerning the relationship between price-cap regulation and qual-
ity: After the introduction of quality regulation in Norway, the social cost
of electricity distribution decreased, which means that welfare increased.
The decrease of the social costs and the increase in quality were due to the
new regulation regime in that, by charging a price for outages, it induced
electricity companies to substitute cost for outages in a more socially favor-
able manner.
These results have implications for regulatory policy: If quality can be ob-
served and contractually specified it might well be worthwhile to directly
regulate it.
Concerning the correct cost of capital: The electricity industry is in-
deed characterized by a lower credit default risk than the telecom industry.
When designing their price-cap regime, electricity regulators therefore have
strong additional arguments for prescribing a lower WACC than telecom
regulators.
Chapter 2
Price-Cap Regulation And
Investment:
Static Versus Dynamic DEA In
Electricity Regulation – The Case Of
US Transmission System Operators1
Abstract
In this paper a dynamic DEA-model is developed that takes up Nemoto
and Goto (1999)’s concept of quasi-fixed inputs but can dispense with price-
information as it solely deals with technical efficiencies that are derived in
an additive-model type of setting. This model is applied to the data of
50 of the largest US electric transmission system operators in the period
2000-2006 in order to show that the static DEA-models that are usually
employed by electricity regulators can lead to wrong conclusions about the
enterprises’ efficiency since they ignore the short-run fixity of essential inputs
like transmission lines.
1This paper has been presented at the
• Internationale Energiewirtschaftliche Tagung (IEWT), February 2007, Vienna, Aus-
tria.
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2.1 Introduction and literature
When electricity regulators establish an incentive based regulatory regime
like “RPI-X”—practically the standard throughout Europe—it is one of their
most important tasks to assess the efficiency of the regulated enterprises as
objectively and impartially as possible in order to be able to prescribe fair
individual productivity gains that the enterprises have to achieve in the up-
coming regulatory period.
To that end a few parametric and non-parametric methods have been em-
ployed. A very popular and instructive non-parametric approach is the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as pioneered by Charnes et al. (1978). The
merit of DEA is that it specifies an efficient frontier without the need for
the definition of a production function by laying a convex hull around the
empirically available input-output combinations of the players in the sample.
Following Farrell (1957)’s pioneering approach, efficiency of the respective
enterprise is then usually measured by the distance between the observation
and the estimated ideal on the efficient frontier. Apart from the applica-
tion of DEA by diverse regulatory agencies in practice, also in the literature
abundant variations of DEA to assess the efficiency of electricity enterprises
within a country or across countries2 can be found.
Regulation in liberalized electricity markets is primarily focused on the net-
work (that is natural monopoly)-part of the regulated enterprises and this
business is particularly characterized by “quasi-fixed” inputs like transformer
stations and transmission cables/lines that cannot be adjusted to their opti-
mal levels instantaneously, such that decisions about the level of investment
in one period have important implications not only for the efficiency in that
period but also for that of subsequent ones. In other words: The characteris-
tics of the liberalized electricity markets and especially those of the network
2See, for example, Pollitt (1995) for an investigation of US and UK transmission and
distribution firms, Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) and Forsund and Kittelsen (1998)
for the use of Malmquist-indices to assess the productivity growth of electricity industries
in Sweden and Norway, Giannakis et al. (2005) for the incorporation of quality into a
benchmarking-system based on DEA or von Hischhausen et al. (2006) for an application
to German distribution firms (this is just a small selection, for a comprehensive—albeit
not all too recent—overview, see Jamasb and Pollitt (2000)).
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part of it call for a dynamic perspective that captures the inter-temporal
aspects of investment in quasi-fixed inputs more accurately.
The first ones to explicitly incorporate quasi-fixed inputs in a dynamic DEA-
model3 were Nemoto and Goto (1999)4 who treated them at the end of one
period as if they were outputs in that period and essential inputs in the
subsequent one. In this setting the firm faces installation costs: the more
resources are consumed in installing quasi-fixed inputs, the less there are left
over for producing outputs5. On the other hand, more quasi-fixed inputs in
the next period mean greater production possibilities and therefore profits in
that and subsequent periods. This is the basic trade-off the firm faces: Either
maximize output myopically in this period or invest in quasi-fixed inputs to
increase output in subsequent ones.
Figure 2.1 is supposed to illustrate this concept. Variable inputs xt and
quasi-fixed inputs kt−1 at the beginning of period t are transformed by the
production process Pt into regular outputs yt and quasi-fixed inputs kt at
the end of that period. These quasi-fixed inputs kt and the new variable
inputs xt+1 are then inputs in the production process Pt+1 of the subsequent
period t+1. Drawing from this theoretic framework Nemoto and Goto later
conducted an empirical study in which they investigated the dynamic efficien-
cies of 9 privately owned vertically integrated Japanese electric utilities under
Rate-of-Return-regulation between 1981-1995 (Nemoto and Goto, 2003). In
order to get a measure of efficiency for the respective firms, they basically
compared the actual cost with the cost that would have arisen, had the in-
puts been used technically, allocatively and dynamically efficient. They find
that the main source of inefficiency is the dynamically inefficient (too high)
use of quasi-fixed inputs which could be seen as empirical evidence for the
conjectured “Averch-Johnson”-effect.
3Alternative ways to bring a dynamic aspect into DEA are those introduced by Sen-
gupta (1995), Fare et al. (1996), Emrouznejad and Thanassoulis (2005) and Mateo et al.
(2006).
4Ouellette and Vierstraete (2004) also discuss quasi-fixed inputs but solely in the sense
of non-discretionary inputs and thus without the above dynamic implications.
5Nemoto and Goto were also able to relate their approach seamlessly to the adjustment-
cost theory of investment, so that it provides a non-parametric alternative to the econo-
metric Euler equation approach (Nemoto and Goto, 1999, Appendix).
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Figure 2.1: The technology of dynamic DEA
Source: Nemoto and Goto (2003)
Sueyoshi and Sekitani (2005) later incorporated returns to scale into dy-
namic DEA as conceptualized by Nemoto and Goto. Amirteimoori (2006)
also takes up their idea and develops a dynamic DEA with revenue efficiency.
What Nemoto and Goto’s approach and its successors have in common, is
their founding on cost (or revenue) efficiency. The immediate problem, that
arises when trying to apply such a model to the above discussed practical
problem of assessing the efficiency of transmission system operators, is the
extreme difficulty of finding correct prices for the typical in- and outputs in
this industry.
In this paper, a dynamic DEA-model will therefore be developed that takes
up Nemoto and Goto’s concept of quasi-fixed inputs but can dispense with
price-information as it solely deals with technical efficiencies that are derived
in an additive-model type of setting6. To show the practical relevance of this
approach, the dynamic efficiency of 50 of the largest US transmission system
operators is calculated and these results are contrasted with those of a more
conventional static approach.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In sections 2.2 and 2.3
the mathematical formulation of the static and dynamic DEA-models will
be provided that are to be employed in the remaining empirical part of the
paper. In section 2.4 the data and its sources will be discussed. Section
2.5, the core of the paper, is devoted to the presentation of the main results
6Nemoto and Goto (2003) also calculate technical efficiencies in order to disentangle
the various sources of inefficiencies but their definition of it requires the availability of
prices as well (see Nemoto and Goto, 2003, p. 196).
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and the discussion of its implications. Section 2.6, finally, sums up the main
points made.
2.2 The dynamic DEA-model7
2.2.1 The production possibility set
Let xt denote a l × 1 vector of variable inputs used in period t, kt a m × 1
vector of quasi-fixed inputs at the end of period t, and yt a n × 1 vector of
outputs produced in period t. The firm (or “decision making unit” – DMU)
puts xt and kt−1 into both production processes and investment activities in
order to supply yt to the market and to hold kt at the end of that period.
All combinations of (xt, kt−1) ∈ R
l+m
+ and (kt, yt) ∈ R
m+n
+ , where the latter
is producible from the former, constitute the production possibility set in
period t:
Φt = {(xt, kt−1, kt, yt) ∈ Rl+m × Rm+n| (xt, kt−1) can yield (kt, yt)} (2.1)
It is required that Φt satisfies the regularity conditions:
(i) if
(
x˜t, k˜t−1, kt, yt
)
∈ Φt and
(
x˜t, k˜t−1
)
≤ (kt, yt),
then (xt, kt−1, kt, yt) ∈ Φt;
(ii) if
(
xt, kt−1, k˜t, y˜t
)
∈ Φt and
(
x˜t, k˜t−1
)
≥ (kt, yt),
then (xt, kt−1, kt, yt) ∈ Φt;
(iii) Φt is closed and convex
Where (i) and (ii) represent free disposability.
If, moreover, the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale,
Φt becomes a convex cone:
(iv) if (xt, kt−1, kt, yt) ∈ Φt, then (cxt, ckt−1, ckt, cyt) ∈ Φt for any c > 0.
7The mathematical description of the production possibility set is taken from Nemoto
and Goto (2003).
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As the ultimate aim of this endeavor are empirical results a more accurate
description of Φt that satisfies the above conditions is required than what a
mere arbitrary guess of a production function a´ la Cobb-Douglas can yield.
DEA provides a solution to this problem by constructing a polyhedral convex
hull enveloping (hence the name) the observed data:
Suppose N observations, i.e. firms, are available with variable inputs Xt =
(xt1, xt2, . . . , xtN) (each xti represents the input-vector of a firm), quasi-fixed
inputs Kt−1 = (kt−1 1, kt−1 2, . . . , kt−1N) at the beginning of period t and
quasi-fixed inputs Kt = (kt1, kt2, . . . , ktN) at the end of period t.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the smallest set comprising these obser-
vations and satisfying (i)-(iv) takes the form:
Φˆt ={(xt, kt−1, kt, yt) ∈ R
l+m
+ × R
m+n
+ |Xtλt ≤ xt,
Kt−1λt ≤ kt−1, Ktλt ≥ kt, Ytλt ≥ yt, λt ≥ 0}
(2.2)
where λt is a N × 1 intensity vector whose j-th element is denoted by λtj.
2.2.2 Technical efficiency – the additive model
Technical efficiency in the DEA-context can be defined in several ways. In
the original formulation of Charnes et al. (1978), referred to as CCR-model, it
was defined either as to what extent the inputs of each DMU could be reduced
proportionally while remaining on the same isoquant (input-orientation) or
as by how much the outputs could be increased proportionally while holding
inputs constant (output-orientation). In the present dynamic context this
leads to problems as the quasi-fixed inputs have the character of outputs in
period t and that of inputs in period t + 1 and therefore, when trying to
determine the technical efficiency of a DMU, both an input- and an output-
orientation is required.
The so-called additive model (cf. Cooper et al., 2000, p. 91) circumvents the
above problem by combining both orientations. Here efficiency is somewhat
defined the other way round: For each DMU, the maximal sum of all slacks,
i.e. the distances to the efficient frontier in all inputs and outputs, is deter-
mined. A DMU is efficient, only if this sum is zero. Figure 2.2 is supposed
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to illustrate the differences of the two concepts.
Figure 2.2: The CCR- (left) and the Additive model (right)
2.2.3 The inter-temporal LP-problem8
Taking up the efficiency-concept from the additive model leads to the fol-
lowing inter-temporal optimization problem: Maximize the sum of the slacks
of all factors over the entire time-horizon subject to the restrictions of the
production possibility frontier as given by (2.2)9. This problem is equivalent
8LP. . . linear programming
9The model can easily be adapted to the assumption of variable returns to scale by
adding the constraint i′λt = 1 but as this doesn’t alter the main points to be made, this
version will not be explored here.
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to the following linear program:
max
{λt,Sk0 ,Sxt ,Syt}
T
t=1
,{S+kt ,kt}
T−1
t=1
,{S−kt}
T
t=2
γikSk0+
T∑
t=1
γtixSxt +
T∑
t=1
γtiySyt
+
T−1∑
t=1
γtikS
+
kt
+
T∑
t=2
γtikS
−
kt
s.t. K0λ1 + Sk0 = k0
Xtλt + Sxt = xt t = 1, . . . , T
Ytλt − Syt = yt t = 1, . . . , T
Ktλt − S
+
kt
− kt = 0 t = 1, . . . , T − 1
Kt−1λt + S
−
kt
− kt−1 = 0 t = 2, . . . , T
{λt, Sk0 , Sxt , Syt}
T
t=1 ,
{
S+kt , kt
}T−1
t=1
,
{
S−kt
}T
t=2
≥ 0
(2.3)
where λ is an intensity vector, γ is a discount factor, id is a d-dimensional
vector of ones, k0 is the initial exogenous value of quasi-fixed inputs, Sx is
the vector of variable input-slacks, Sy is the vector of output-slacks, S
+
k is
the vector of k-slacks when it functions as an output and S−k is the vector
k-slacks when it functions as an input. The program determines for each
DMU the maximal slack-value for each input and output category for every
point in time.
The inter-temporal aspect in this program is represented by the constraints
4 and 5: The program tries to find the combination of S+kt , S
−
kt
and kt for each
period that maximizes the total slack. In other words: Whereas the values of
the variable inputs of each period are the exogenously given (but controllable
by the firm) observed data, only the initial value for the quasi-fixed input is
given exogenously and the subsequent optimal values are determined in the
process of the optimization. It can be seen from (2.5) (in Appendix A. A), the
dual of (2.3), that on the one hand the dts, representing the shadow prices of
constraint 4 in (2.3), are always negative, such that a bigger k decreases the
amount of total slacks and therefore increases efficiency. On the other hand,
however, the ets, representing the shadow prices of constraint 5 in (2.3), are
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always positive, such that a bigger k increases the amount of total slacks and
therefore decreases efficiency.
This is where the basic trade-off of the firm is manifested: On the one hand it
wants to close its gap to the efficient frontier concerning the outputs and thus
also increase its amount of quasi-fixed inputs in period t but on the other
hand such an increased amount of quasi-fixed inputs reduces its efficiency
concerning the inputs in period t + 1. This dilemma shall be illustrated by
figure 2.3 which depicts the situation of a firm with one variable input, one
quasi-fixed input and one output in periods t and t+ 1.
Since the slacks will be of different dimensions, the maximized objective
value cannot be taken directly as a measure of efficiency.
Therefore, firstly, the inefficiency of a DMU in each factor (input, output or
quasi-fixed input) in a year is calculated by relating its optimized slack S∗Fi
to the actual value Fi:
Inputs (including q-f-inputs):
ineff ti =
S∗Fi
Fi
, i ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,m+ n)
Outputs (including q-f-outputs):
ineff ti =
S∗Fi
SFi + Fi
, i ∈ (m+ 1, . . . ,m+ n+ l)
Secondly, the annual-inefficiency per DMU is the average of all ineffis:
Ineff t =
1
m+ n+ l
m+n+l∑
i=1
ineff ti .
Total inefficiency is finally taken to be the average of each annual-inefficiency:
INEFF =
1
T
T∑
i=1
Ineff t.
Consequently, the efficiencies are derived by subtracting the respective inef-
ficiencies from 1.
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The relevance and importance of such a dynamic perspective becomes par-
ticularly evident when contrasting its empirical results with those of a more
traditional static perspective. To that end, in the next section, the static
setting will be specified.
2.3 The static DEA-model
Broadly speaking, in the static setting the optimization problem remains the
same as before except for the inter-temporal aspects, that is, the quasi-fixed
inputs in each period are taken to be exogenously given (but controllable by
the firm) and therefore have the character of “normal” variable inputs. The
corresponding LP-program looks as follows:
max
{Skt−1 ,Sxt ,Syt ,λt}
T
t=1
T∑
t=1
γt
(
ikSkt−1 + ixSxt + iySyt
)
s.t. Kt−1λt + Skt−1 = kt−1 t = 1, 2, . . . , T
Xtλt + Sxt = xt t = 1, 2, . . . , T
Ytλt − Syt = yt t = 1, 2, . . . , T{
Skt−1 , Sxt , Syt , λt
}T
t=1
≥ 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(2.4)
The efficiency measures are calculated exactly as in the dynamic model.
2.4 The data
The data for the empirical investigation stems from 50 of the largest (by
transmission line length) transmission system operators (TSOs) in the United
States for the period 2000-2006. Information on a total of about 100 such
utilities is available, but non-responses, unresolvable data inconsistencies and
the need for a balanced panel reduce this number.
The reason why the US were chosen is first, that here, as opposed to the EU,
for example, for each utility reliable, impartial and standardized information
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is available through the Form 110 filings of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). Secondly, since the process of unbundling the electric-
ity industry11 has started relatively early in the US and is therefore already
rather established (see Kwoka et al. (2007) for details), for each utility the
transmission part of operations, which is the only relevant part for my inves-
tigation, is separately accounted for in the Form 1 filings.
According to the requirements of the model, the following in-, out- and quasi-
fixed inputs were chosen:
• Inputs:
– x 1: Transmission materials and supplies: $ (Form 1 p. 227)
– x 2: Transmission salaries and wages: $ (Form 1 p. 354-355)
• Quasi-fixed Inputs:
– k 1: Transmission-line length: miles (Form 1 p. 422-423)
– k 2: Total installed transformer capacity accountable to transmis-
sion: MVA12 (Form 1 p. 426-427)
• Output:
– y 1: Transmission of electricity for others: MWh13 (Form 1 p.
328-330)
As a discount factor γ, 1
1+0.06
was chosen.
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 shows in column 1 the ranking of the respective enterprise accord-
ing to its achieved dynamic total efficiency (column 3) and in column 4 the
10Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form No. 1 is a comprehensive financial and
operating report that forms the basis for Electric Rate regulation and financial audits.
11“Unbundling” roughly means the mandated or volunteered process of separation of
formerly vertically integrated suppliers of electricity into generation, transmission and
distribution functions.
12Mega-Volt-Amperes
13Mega-Watt-hours
CHAPTER 2. PRICE-CAP REGULATION AND INVESTMENT 20
Dynamic Dynamic Static Static
Rank TSO Efficiency Rank TSO Efficiency
1 Vermont.Electric.Power.Company..Inc. 0.986 1 Central.Maine.Power.Company 0.88
2 The.Dayton.Power.and.Light.Company 0.959 2 Public.Service.Company.of.New.Hampshire 0.811
3 Kentucky.Utilities.Company 0.949 3 Western.Massachusetts.Electric.Company 0.806
4 Central.Maine.Power.Company 0.941 4 Allette.Inc. 0.802
5 Gulf.Power.Company 0.911 5 Puget.Sound.Energy..Inc. 0.791
6 Central.Vermont.Public.Service.Corporation 0.91 6 Vermont.Electric.Power.Company..Inc. 0.762
7 Western.Massachusetts.Electric.Company 0.908 7 The.Dayton.Power.and.Light.Company 0.748
8 Public.Service.Company.of.New.Hampshire 0.903 8 Connecticut.Light.and.Power.Company..The 0.747
9 Puget.Sound.Energy..Inc. 0.879 9 Westar.Energy..Inc. 0.746
10 Boston.Edison.Company 0.878 10 Central.Vermont.Public.Service.Corporation 0.732
11 Tucson.Electric.Power.Company 0.857 11 Portland.General.Electric.Company 0.729
12 Pacific.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.853 12 Aquila.Inc. 0.726
13 Allette.Inc. 0.846 13 Cleco.Power.LLC 0.712
14 Mississippi.Power.Company 0.838 14 Kentucky.Utilities.Company 0.709
15 Entergy.Gulf.States..Inc. 0.83 15 Southwestern.Public.Service.Company 0.708
16 Aquila.Inc. 0.826 16 Northern.States.Power.Company..Minnesota. 0.706
17 Commonwealth.Edison.Company 0.826 17 Duquesne.Light.Company 0.706
18 Florida.Power...Light.Company 0.821 18 Kansas.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.705
19 Connecticut.Light.and.Power.Company..The 0.821 19 Illinois.Power.Company 0.685
20 Wolverine.Power.Supply.Cooperative..Inc. 0.82 20 Tucson.Electric.Power.Company 0.684
21 Westar.Energy..Inc. 0.817 21 Boston.Edison.Company 0.662
22 Portland.General.Electric.Company 0.817 22 Otter.Tail.Corporation 0.655
23 Southwestern.Public.Service.Company 0.815 23 Black.Hills.Power.Inc. 0.647
24 Duquesne.Light.Company 0.807 24 Entergy.Gulf.States..Inc. 0.647
25 Louisville.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.804 25 MDU.Resources.Group..Inc. 0.645
26 Cleco.Power.LLC 0.803 26 Mississippi.Power.Company 0.644
27 Kansas.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.802 27 Florida.Power...Light.Company 0.638
28 Northern.States.Power.Company..Minnesota. 0.798 28 Louisville.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.629
29 Avista.Corporation 0.797 29 Gulf.Power.Company 0.629
30 Union.Electric.Company 0.793 30 Pacific.Gas.and.Electric.Company 0.628
31 Black.Hills.Power.Inc. 0.786 31 Union.Electric.Company 0.612
32 Rochester.Gas.and.Electric.Corporation 0.782 32 Avista.Corporation 0.605
33 South.Carolina.Electric...Gas.Company 0.781 33 South.Carolina.Electric...Gas.Company 0.6
34 Entergy.Lousiana..LLC 0.769 34 Public.Service.Company.of.Oklahoma 0.597
35 Illinois.Power.Company 0.761 35 Entergy.Lousiana..LLC 0.596
36 Entergy.Mississippi..Inc. 0.76 36 Southern.California.Edison.Company 0.59
37 Public.Service.Company.of.Oklahoma 0.758 37 Wolverine.Power.Supply.Cooperative..Inc. 0.586
38 Entergy.Arkansas..Inc. 0.755 38 Idaho.Power.Company 0.578
39 Otter.Tail.Corporation 0.747 39 Central.Illinois.Public.Service.Company 0.577
40 Southwestern.Power.Electric.Company 0.744 40 New.York.State.Electric...Gas.Corporation 0.567
41 Southern.California.Edison.Company 0.74 41 Entergy.Arkansas..Inc. 0.566
42 MDU.Resources.Group..Inc. 0.734 42 Chugach.Electric.Association..Inc. 0.564
43 Carolina.Power...Light.Company 0.725 43 Entergy.Mississippi..Inc. 0.555
44 New.York.State.Electric...Gas.Corporation 0.725 44 Bangor.Hydro.Electric.Company 0.548
45 Alabama.Power.Company 0.718 45 Rochester.Gas.and.Electric.Corporation 0.54
46 Idaho.Power.Company 0.694 46 Alabama.Power.Company 0.523
47 Central.Illinois.Public.Service.Company 0.692 47 El.Paso.Electric.Company 0.521
48 Bangor.Hydro.Electric.Company 0.684 48 Carolina.Power...Light.Company 0.5
49 El.Paso.Electric.Company 0.661 49 Southwestern.Power.Electric.Company 0.445
50 Chugach.Electric.Association..Inc. 0.65 50 Commonwealth.Edison.Company 0.279
Table 2.1: Total-efficiency ranking according to dynamic and static model
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ranking according to its achieved static total efficiency (column 6).
In this depiction two important implications of applying the dynamic instead
of the static model become apparent: First, the ranking changes significantly
and second, total efficiency of all enterprises increases. That this phenom-
enon seems to be particularly true for those TSOs for which the static model
diagnosed a relatively poor performance shall be illustrated by figure 2.4.
The underestimation of the enterprises’ efficiency by the static relative to
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of dynamic and static total efficiency
the dynamic model becomes also evident when looking at figure 2.5, which
shows the evolvement of the annual average efficiency of the sample according
to the respective model. Apparently, the average efficiency deteriorated in
both cases but the development in the dynamic case looks rather smooth and
continuous whereas in the static case it exhibits pronounced upward spikes
in 2001 and 2005.
In order to identify the reasons for this development, the mean annual inef-
ficiencies (i.e. slacks) of each factor in the static case are depicted in figure
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Figure 2.5: Annual mean of efficiencies in the sample per model
2.6 and for the dynamic case in figure 2.7. From a static perspective, every
year output y is the biggest source of inefficiency, followed by variable inputs
x and quasi-fixed inputs k. With y and the ks a cyclic development can be
observed, in that inefficiency increases from 2000 until 2003, decreases until
2005 and strongly increases again in 2006. The development of the xs, on
the other hand, is more erratic, but with a clear upward trend. Altogether,
the static view seems to suggest that the TSOs could not consolidate the
achieved efficiency gains concerning the xs between 2000 and 2001 and even
less so those concerning y and the ks between 2003 and 2005 so that in the
end they were worse off than at the beginning.
Even though the patterns of the xs and y look similar in the dynamic case
(figure 2.7), the different pattern of the ks significantly alters the overall in-
terpretation: Here, k− (i.e. k as an input, the equivalent to the static k)
doesn’t contribute substantially to inefficiency. The inefficiency of k+ (i.e. k
as an output), however, increases rather exponentially from 2001 to 200514.
14Please note, that in 2006, being the terminal period, inefficiency of k+ doesn’t exist
per definition
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Figure 2.6: Origin of inefficiency per factor (static model)
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In other words, as opposed to the static view, which suggests that TSOs were
persistently over -equipped with quasi-fixed inputs, the dynamic view indi-
cates that TSOs were increasingly under -equipped with quasi-fixed inputs,
which contributed significantly to the overall deterioration of efficiency.
The importance of this last point shall be explained by means of figure 2.8.
It shows for a representative selection of 6 TSOs the annual percentage-
deviation of the actual transmission-line length (k 1) from the optimal value
as prescribed by the respective model15. Therefore, a positive value means
that in the respective year the TSO had too many miles of transmission line
and a negative one that it had too few of them.
From this exemplary depiction the following main characteristics can be
inferred: First, whenever both models detect an over-supply of the quasi-
fixed input (positive values), the deviation according to the static model is
at least as big as the one according to the dynamic model but usually much
bigger. Second, the static model always sees an over-supply of the quasi-fixed
input, whereas the dynamic model also detects significant under-supply in
many cases. Third, the recommendations of the static model are usually
rather erratic whereas the paths recommended by the dynamic model are
quite smooth and thus reflect the naturally limited annual change-rates of
the quasi-fixed input much better.
These observations are the direct outcome of the different model specifica-
tions since the static model assumes the level of quasi-fixed inputs as ex-
ogenously given (but controllable by the firm) in each period whereas in the
dynamic model only the initial value is exogenous but subsequent ones are
determined endogenously. This of course has significant consequences on the
amount of quasi-fixed inputs that is deemed optimal in each period in that
the static model myopically seeks to minimize the amount of inputs solely
for the respective period, whereas the dynamic model also takes into account
that the level of quasi-fixed inputs in this period has consequences on their
amount in subsequent ones as well and thus on the efficiency in those periods.
15As the picture looks very similar for the other q.-f. input, k 2, it is omitted here.
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Figure 2.8: Deviation of actual transmission-line length (k 1) from optimal
value of a selection of representative TSOs
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2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to develop a dynamic DEA-model in order to
show that the conventional static DEA-models that are usually employed by
electricity regulators can lead to wrong conclusions about the enterprises’
efficiency since they ignore the short-run fixity of essential inputs like trans-
mission lines. To that end, first, a dynamic DEA-model was formulated that
takes up Nemoto and Goto (1999)’s concept of quasi-fixed inputs but can dis-
pense with price-information as it solely deals with technical efficiencies that
are derived in an additive-model type of setting. Along with a conventional
static model, this model was then applied to the data of 50 of the largest US
transmission system operators in the period 2000-2006.
A comparison of the results can be summarized as follows:
First, compared to the dynamic model, the static model generally underesti-
mates the efficiency of enterprises (this seems to be especially true for those
enterprises with a particularly low static score).
Second, the prescribed efficient paths of the quasi-fixed inputs are much
smoother in the dynamic model than in the static model and therefore re-
flect the nature of quasi-fixed inputs more adequately.
Third, the dynamic model usually prescribes much less severe reductions in
the quasi-fixed inputs than the static model and, contrary to it, even suggests
significant increases in many cases.
These results show that the static model doesn’t acknowledge the efficiency
enhancing effects of quasi-fixed inputs as much as the dynamic model. A
sole reliance of regulators on such a static model might therefore indeed
mislead enterprises to increase their efficiency by cutting down investment
in their transmission lines and transformer capacity. Bearing in mind that
these quasi-fixed inputs are essential for reliable and high-quality electricity
supply, it becomes clear that this can have very undesirable consequences.
To put it together: Especially regulators who are interested in whether the
enterprises under scrutiny employ efficient amounts of capital inputs should
definitely have a look at dynamic efficiencies and not rely on a static efficiency
analysis only.
Appendices
A. A The dual of the dynamic model
min
a,{bt,ct}
T
t=1,{dt}
T−1
t=1 ,{et}
T
t=2
ak0 +
T∑
t=1
btxt +
T∑
t=1
ctyt
s.t aK0 + b1X1 + c1Y1 + d1K1 ≥ 0
btXt + ctYt + dtKt + etKt−1 ≥ 0 t = 2, . . . , T − 1
bTXT + cTYT + eTKT ≥ 0
a ≥ γik
bt ≥ γ
tix t = 1, . . . , T
ct ≤ −γ
tiy t = 1, . . . , T
dt ≤ −γ
tik t = 1, . . . , T − 1
et ≥ γ
tik t = 2, . . . , T
a, {bt, ct}
T
t=1 , {dt}
T−1
t=1 , {et}
T
t=2 free in sign
(2.5)
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Chapter 3
Price-Cap Regulation And
Quality:
Did Quality Regulation Pay Off In
Norway? Dynamic Comparisons Of
Allocative Efficiency And Welfare1
Abstract
In this paper we derive sufficient conditions for an increase in welfare due to
quality regulation of electricity and then show how these conditions can be
checked by means of cost Malmquist indices and their decomposition. The
application of this method to a representative sample of distribution system
operators in Norway—one of the first countries where quality regulation was
introduced—yields strong evidence for a positive effect of quality regulation
on welfare.
1This paper is co-authored with Anton Burger (Research Institute for Regulatory Eco-
nomics, Vienna University of Economics and BA) and has been presented at the
• EEA-ESEM (22nd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association and
62nd European Meeting of the Econometrics Society), August 2007, Budapest,
Hungary.
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3.1 Introduction
In the wake of major blackouts and plummeting customer satisfaction with
the quality of service in the liberalized electricity markets in Europe, two
pressing questions have arisen:
• Whether and in how far is the prevalent price-cap regulation detrimen-
tal to quality?
• Whether and in how far can quality regulation help to counter these
developments?
Concerning the first question, qualms are backed by theoretical analysis (see
Kidokoro (2002) for example) but empirical evidence is scarce. Kridel et al.
(1996) and Sappington (2003) found mixed impacts of different regulatory
regimes on the quality of telecommunication service providers2. In a recent
survey, Sappington (2003) did not draw an unequivocal conclusion about the
effects of incentive regulation on the quality delivered by firms and suggests
further research. Ter-Martiroysan (2003) is the only paper that investigates
electricity distribution network providers. In a sample of 78 utilities from 23
U.S. federal states, Ter-Martiroysan finds that price-cap regulation is associ-
ated with an increase in the average duration of outages but explicit quality
benchmarks reduce this figure again.
This directly leads to the second question and when trying to answer it in a
positive—instead of a normative3—fashion, the focus of attention naturally
shifts to Norway as it was one the very first countries where quality of ser-
vice was explicitly combined with a price-cap regulation regime. Specifically,
the electricity suppliers have to pay a penalty according to the expected
cost that the undelivered energy causes with the respective customers. This
regime was introduced in 2001, revised in 2003 and 2005 and led to a devel-
opment of energy-not-supplied (ENS) in Norway as illustrated in figure 3.1.
2Other studies are: Roycroft and Murrilo (2000), Banerjee (2003), Clements (2004)
and Ai et al. (2004).
3Theory supports such incentive schemes and the corresponding argument has been put
into a nutshell by Sappington (2005): ”By specifying service quality targets and associated
penalties and bonuses, a regulator can induce the regulated firm to employ its superior
cost information to achieve desirable levels of service quality”
CHAPTER 3. PRICE-CAP REGULATION AND QUALITY 30
As can be seen, between 1999 (pre quality-regulation) and 2005 the amount
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Figure 3.1: Development of ENS (MWh) in Norway
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) -
http://www.nve.no
of ENS decreased by more than 50%.
More important than these sheer figures, is first, whether this development
was beneficial from a social point of view, i.e. whether welfare as a whole
increased, and second to what extent the new regulatory regime can actually
be accounted for such potential welfare changes. As will be shown in section
3.3.1, in this context, these questions can be affirmed if the overall cost- and
allocative efficiencies of the firms increased in the respective period.
Since we will check these properties by means of so called cost Malmquist in-
dices that incorporate quality, this directly leads to a strand of literature that
investigates the incorporation of quality into the efficiency measurement of
electricity network providers: Giannakis et al. (2005) have shown that quality
is an important aspect of the performance of electricity network operators
and should be incorporated into a benchmark-study. However, Korhonen
and Syrja¨nen (2003) were, to our knowledge, the first ones to use quality in a
benchmark-study of electricity network operators. They find improvements
in efficiency scores when quality of service was added. A study that uses
Malmquist-indices to compare the efficiency of electricity distribution com-
panies in Nordic countries has been performed by Edvardsen and Forsund
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(2003). Growitsch et al. (2005) used stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) for a
sample of 500 European electricity distribution companies to find that qual-
ity and quantity could form a cost function that features increasing returns
to scale in the two output case.
To the authors best knowledge, however, the two above stated important
questions concerning welfare have not yet been addressed in the literature.
The aim of this paper is therefore to determine theoretically sufficient condi-
tions of a welfare increase due to quality regulation and to check empirically
whether these conditions are fulfilled in the case of Norway.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 will present the
Norwegian system of quality regulation in more detail. Section 3.3 contains
our methodology where we first derive the sufficient conditions for a welfare
increase in Norway due to regulation, formulate corresponding hypotheses
and show how they can be checked with cost Malmquist indices and their de-
composition. In section 3.4 our variables and our empirical model setup will
be explained. This will be followed in section 3.5 by an account of the main
results concerning the confirmation or rejection of our hypotheses. Finally
we will make some concluding remarks in section 3.6.
3.2 Quality regulation – the case of Norway
The liberalization of the Norwegian energy sector, observed by the Norwegian
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) began with the introduction
of a new energy law in 1990. After a period of Rate-of-Return regulation
(RoR) price-cap regulation was introduced in 1997 which was based on a
benchmark-study conducted in the same year (cf. Bundesnetzagentur, 2006).
In the regulatory period 2002-2006 the incentive regime was supplemented by
a system of quality regulation (Kinnunen, 2003) in which network providers
have to pay penalties for energy-not-delivered (see table 3.1, p. 47, for the
incentive rates). The basic idea of such penalties is to internalize the external
effect of a failure of the electricity distribution system. The incentive rates in
table 3.1 should act like a Pigou-tax which induces firms to take the costs of
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the external effect into account. If the incentive rates are set appropriately,
firms choose the trade off between costs and outages, such that the marginal
costs of an additional hour of electricity interruption and the marginal cost
of avoiding the interruption are equal4.
Setting an incentive rate does not determine whether firms will loose or gain
money. In the Norwegian case, the maximum allowed revenue of a network
provider differs from the price-cap maximum revenue by the difference be-
tween the actual outage costs a firm caused, and the expected outage costs
of that firm. Expected outage costs, (which, of course, vary from firm to
firm) are estimated by the regulator by considering outage costs of the last
five years and a panel regression (Haber and Dara, 2005). Additionally, im-
provements in the expected outage costs are prescribed by the regulator.
To sum up, the level of quality supplied is set by firms by equating marginal
costs of quality provision and the incentive rate and thus depends only on
the incentive rate. The distribution of payments however, depends on the
target level set by the regulator. The penalties paid by firms are transferred
to the regulator which is a government authority. Only in the new regulatory
period which begins in 2007, payments which have to be made by firms will
be used to reduce prices for customers.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Quality regulation and welfare
To be able to discuss the economic effects which are at work when a quality
regulation scheme is implemented, we will set up an economic framework.
Welfare in the area of each of the i = 1 . . . N local monopolists consists of
three parts, namely consumer surplus, producer surplus and transfer pay-
4Of course, different firms which face different marginal costs of providing quality would
offer different quality levels. This is why a lot of regulators (not Norway), additionally,
introduced minimum standards to avoid having some customers of minor importance suf-
fering from too many outages even if this would be economically efficient. Thus it can be
argued that the incentive rates (which are called cost of energy not supplied in Norway),
indeed serve the purpose of efficiency, whereas minimum standards have their justification
in fairness and public good considerations.
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ments which are a function of outages o and represent the penalties a firm
might pay under quality regulation.
Wi = CSi + (pii − Ti(o)) + Ti(o) (3.1)
Transfer payments have a positive welfare value as such payments are re-
distributed somehow (either to the government or to consumers). In our
formulation, it does not matter how the cost savings are distributed between
the general public and the regulated firm: As long as potential payments of
firms have no effect on prices, they cancel out. Moreover we assume that con-
sumers have quasi-linear preferences such that there are no income effects.
Therefore, aggregated welfare in the Norwegian electricity industry in period
t can be defined as the sum of welfare in each submarket i which is the dif-
ference between gross surplus GSti and social costs of electricity production
5
Cti in each submarket:
Wt =
N∑
i=1
∫ yi,t
0
Pi(y, q(o)) dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
GSit
−Cit(y, o) (3.2)
The inverse aggregate demand function Pi(y, q(o)) in each market depends
on the quantity y of the good and the long run level of quality q and is
allowed to differ in the submarkets to account for varying characteristics
such as the potential market size. Between two points in time, however,
these characteristics are assumed to be constant as we do not consider a too
long time span. Demand is downward sloping ∂Pi(·)
∂q
< 0. Quantity can be
interpreted as number of accesses to electricity. See for example Dro¨ttboom
(1996, p. 10 f.) for a similar approach. The long run level of quality q
is tantamount here with the level of expected quality. Expected quality q
is what potential consumers of electricity adapt to. Firms might set up
operations or reduce own back up production and more generally, quality
increases the private households willingness to pay so we have ∂Pi(·)
∂q
> 0.
5with social cost of electricity production we mean monetary costs of electricity com-
panies (what they spend on equipment, personnel...) plus costs of outages.
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Quality depends negatively on realized outages. Since low o and thus a
higher expected quality induces higher demand we have ∂
2Pi(·)
∂q∂o
< 0. Later
on, we will use the assumption that an increase in quality has a similar effect
on each consumer, that is, it raises the willingness to pay independently of the
original willingness to pay. So we have ∂
2Pi(·)
∂q∂o
= ∂
2P (·)
∂q∂o
∀i.With our framework,
as already indicated in section 3.1, we want to answer two questions: First,
did welfare increase in this industry since 2001 and second, how can that be
attributed to the quality regulation regime? We will now establish sufficient
conditions for welfare to increase. Analytically, a welfare increase means
W2005 −W2001 > 0 or equivalently
GS2005 −GS2001︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆GS
−C2005 − C2001︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆C
> 0 (3.3)
We will first establish sufficient conditions for an increase in gross surplus.
The following expression approximates changes in GS between two points in
time. The derivation of (3.4) can be found in appendix A. A. (3.4) shall
serve as a sufficient condition for gross welfare to increase or at least, stay
constant.
∆GS12 ≈
N∑
i=1
(Pi(·)∆y12) +
∂2P (·)
∂q∂o
N∑
i=1
yi,2∆o12 > 0 (3.4)
The effects of a change in outages (∆o12) on gross surplus is approximated
by the third part of (3.4). As we consider the sum of surpluses in N mar-
kets, a deterioration of quality could still be offset by increased quality in
other markets. To be able to compare welfare changes we have to make the
assumption that an increase in quality has a similar effect on every customer
since we have limited data on which consumers value their increased quality
by how much (see above). ∂
2P (·)
∂q∂o
is the change in consumers willingness to
pay if outages decrease (and quality increases thereafter) which is multiplied
by weighted quality changes in the different submarkets, with weights being
given by quantities in the market (yi,2). We know that
∂2P (·)
∂q∂o
is negative so
if weighted quantity changes are negative as well, there is a positive effect of
CHAPTER 3. PRICE-CAP REGULATION AND QUALITY 35
quality changes of gross surplus.
We now have to make an argument on prices and quantities. Each submarket
is divided once again because of third degree price discrimination. We can
rely on Varian (1985) here who established a sufficient condition for a wel-
fare increase in that market form. The condition is that the output changes,
weighted by mark-ups be positive. As long as mark-ups are not too differ-
ent, an increase in quantity is a sufficient condition for a welfare increase in
one of the regional submarkets. As we can now see from the second part of
(3.4), quantity changes in the different submarkets (∆y12) can be weighted
by prices and added up to approximate welfare changes. This means that as
long as prices are not too different in the submarkets (which is reasonable, as
all firms are in the same regulatory system), an increase in overall quantity
is sufficient for a welfare increase. Probably, there are other markets as well
where the increased quality of electricity supply had a positive effect but as
we do partial analysis here, we do not account for that. In order to check
our sufficient condition (3.4) for an increase in GS in Norway we had a look
at a representative sample of Norwegian distribution system operators (see
section 3.4.2 for details) and within this sample the sum of the changes in
outages was negative (energy not supplied (o): -608.4031562) and the sum of
customer changes was positive (Number of customers: +22794). Moreover,
the number of customers increased in 28 of 31 regional submarkets. So we
can claim that gross surplus increased.From equation (3.3) it is furthermore
clear then that the sole remaining condition for a welfare increase in Norway
is whether ∆C < 0. Checking this condition for our sample and finding
out whether regulation can be accounted for a potential confirmation of this
condition will therefore constitute the remaining part of this paper. More
specifically, we will check the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 After the introduction of quality regulation in Norway, the
social cost of electricity distribution decreased. By referring to our
welfare framework this means, that welfare increased.
Hypothesis 2 The decrease of the social costs and the increase in quality
are due to the new regulation regime in that, by charging a price for
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outages, it induced electricity companies to substitute cost for outages
in a more socially favorable manner.
As will be shown in the following section, we will check hypothesis 1 by means
of cost Malmquist productivity indices and hypothesis 2 by decompositions
of them.
3.3.2 Malmquist indices and their decomposition6
The Cost Malmquist (CM) productivity index
The general aim of Malmquist indices is to measure productivity changes and
to determine its reasons by decomposing it into its main sources. Malmquist
indices have been used in a wide range of applications and been extended in
many ways (for an overview see e. g. Fare et al., 1998). In order to answer our
above questions we have to find out how the productivity of the firms changed
in terms of costs. We will therefore adopt the approach of Maniadakis and
Thanassoulis (2004) who define a cost Malmquist (CM) productivity index
and decompose it in such a way as to be able to identify changes in allocative
and technical efficiency, in the technology of production and in input prices.
The CM index is the geometric mean of the CM index of periods t and t+1
and looks as follows:
CM =
[
wtxt+1/Ct(yt+1, wt)
wtxt/Ct(yt, wt)
∗
wt+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, xt+1)
wt+1xt/Ct+1(yt, xt+1)
]1/2
(3.5)
where wtxt ≡
∑N
n=1w
t
nx
t
n and n denotes the n-th input and C
t(yt, wt) is
a standard cost function, defined as the minimum cost required to produce
output yt with prices wt and with a constant returns to scale technology in
period t. The cost ratio wtxt/Ct(yt, wt) measures the extent to which the
aggregate production costs in period t could be reduced, while still producing
output yt with the price vector wt, so it measures overall efficiency in period
t. The rest of the cost ratios are defined analogously.
CM index values smaller than 1 identify productivity progress (less costs for
6This section is largely based on Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004).
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a given output), values greater than 1 indicate regress and a value of 1 means
constant productivity. As will be explained in more detail in section 3.3.3 we
will use this index to check our hypothesis 1.
The decomposition of the CM-index
To be able to disentangle the various possible sources of the change in ef-
ficiency the CM Index can be decomposed into two subcomponents which
can themselves be split into two components each as illustrated in figure
3.2. (3.6) shows the CM of (3.5) rewritten such that an expression for the
Cost - Malmquist In-
dex
Cost-Techincal
Change
Price Effect und
Technical Change
CM
CTC
PE TC
OEC
TEC AEC
Overall-Efficiency
Change
Technical and Al-
locative Efficiency
Change
Figure 3.2: Decompositions of the CM index
so called overall efficiency change (OEC) and the so called cost technical
change (CTC) results:
CM =
wt+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)
wtxt/Ct(yt, wt)
∗
[
wtxt+1/Ct(yt+1, wt)
wt+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)
×
wtxt/Ct(yt, wt)
wt+1xt/Ct+1(yt, wt+1)
]1/2 (3.6)
The term outside the brackets is the overall efficiency change (OEC), it tells
us by how much the firm managed to move closer to the minimum cost line
at the respective prevailing relative prices (“catch up”). The term inside the
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brackets, CTC, measures the cost boundary shift due to the combined effects
of technical progress and price effects.
The two parts can be decomposed further: First, we can divide the catch
up factor (OEC) into the technical efficiency change (TEC) and allocative
efficiency change (AEC):
OEC =
Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1)
Dti(y
t, xt)
∗
wt+1xt+1/(Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1))
wtxt/(Ct(yt, wt)Dti(y
t, xt))
(3.7)
Where Dti(y
t, xt) is the input distance function that gives the largest factor
by which the input levels in xt can be divided while xt remains in the input
requirement set Lt(yt) = {xt : xt can produce yt}. Dti(y
t, xt) is therefore
defined as
Dti(y
t, xt) = sup
θ
{θ : (xt/θ) ∈ Lt(yt), θ > 0}
and Dt+1i analogously (The i stands for “input orientation”).
The first component of (3.7), (TEC), can also be called the technical catch
up factor and measures by how much a firm came closer to the isoquant. The
second term in (3.7) is allocative efficiency change (AEC) and indicates the
extend to which the firm “catches up” with the optimal input mix regarding
the input prices in each period.
Analogously, (CTC) can be decomposed into a part that accounts for shifts
in the isoquant (TC) and a part that measures the effect of relative input
prices (PE)7:
CTC = TC · PE (3.8)
The technical change component (TC) is the same as the technical change
component of a standard Malmquist-index as used for example in Giannakis
et al. (2005) and measures by how much the change in productivity of firms
can be attributed to technical progress (a shift of the isoquant). The residual
part PE measures the impact of relative input price changes on changes of
7The exact formulation of the decomposition follows similar lines as above and is there-
fore not given in detail here.
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minimum costs.
As with the CM index, with all the discussed indices an index value of less
than 1 identifies an improvement of the firm, a value greater than 1 indicates
deterioration and a value of 1 means stagnation. It will be explained in
section 3.3.3 how the CTC, OEC, TEC, AEC, PE and TC can be used to
check out hypothesis 2.
Computation of the indices and their components
As could be seen in the previous section, the decisive components of the
various indices are the input distance functions Dti(y
t, xt) and the cost func-
tions Ct(yt, wt). These measures are crucially dependent on a definition of
the production possibility set (PPS) and the corresponding isoquants. A
widely used and practical approach to get a workable estimation of the PPS
is the mathematical programming based method Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA). Other so called parametric approaches which are based on estimating
econometrically or by means of mathematical programming a hypothesized
parametric form of the production function or cost boundary are also possi-
ble but not elaborated here. The basic idea behind DEA is to estimate the
PPS by laying a convex hull around the empirically available input-output
combinations of the different players in the sample. The DEA-methodology
can be used to compute the CM index as follows:
Suppose that in each time period t, there are j = 1, ..., J production units
which produce m = 1...M outputs ytkm by using n = 1...N inputs x
t
kn at
prices wtkn. For unit k the cost denoted by w
txt is wtxt ≡
∑N
n=1w
t
nx
t
n. The
costs denoted by wt+1n x
t+1
n , w
t+1
n x
t
n and w
t
nx
t+1
n are defined analogously. For
unit k, the term Ct(yt, wt) can be computed by solving the following linear
CHAPTER 3. PRICE-CAP REGULATION AND QUALITY 40
program:
Ct(yt, wt) =min
x,z
wtknxn (3.9)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
zjy
t
jm ≥ y
t
km
J∑
j=1
zjx
t
jn ≤ x
t
n
zj ≥ 0, xn ≥ 0
where zj is an intensity variable used to form convex combinations of ob-
served inputs and outputs.
The terms Ct(yt+1, wt), Ct+1(yy+1, wt+1) and Ct+1(yt, wt+1) can thus be com-
puted by using the different combinations of prices, technologies and quan-
tities of periods t and tt+1.
In order to get the values for the distance function Dti(y
t, xt) the following
program, as conceptualized by Fare et al. (1989), has to be solved:
[
Dti(y
t, wt)
]−1
=min
θ,z
θ (3.10)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
zjy
t
jm ≥ y
t
km
J∑
j=1
zjx
t
jn ≤ θx
t
kn
zj ≥ 0
Dti(y
t+1, xt+1), Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1) and Dt+1i (y
t, xt) can be derived with the same
model after having adjusted the time periods t and t+ 1 accordingly.
With the CM index, its decomposition and the models to calculate all these
indices from empirical data we have the necessary tools to check the hypothe-
ses from section 3.3.1 as will be shown below.
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3.3.3 Quality regulation and the firm
As stated in section 3.2, the main idea of the new regulation regime of 2001
in Norway was to let the network operators bear the social (or external) cost
of outages by charging a price for them. In what follows we will first show
how this measure affects the behavior of a cost minimizing firm, before we
turn to explaining how this behavioral change can be measured by the above
indices and thus how we can check our hypotheses.
The cost minimization problem of the firm looks as follows:
min
x≥0
wx (3.11)
s.t. f(x) ≥ ŷ
Where w is the vector of input prices, x is the vector of inputs, ŷ is a given
level of output and f(x) is the chosen level of output. The input vector
x′ = (x1, o) ∈ R
+ consists of the monetary input total expenditures x1 and
the physical input outages o. Outages are an undesired output of the firm and
will thus be our first input variable like in Yaisawarng and Klein (1994)8. The
other input we consider is the monetary input total expenditures (TOTEX)
so we are not able to measure any misallocation between capital expendi-
tures (CAPEX) and operating expenditures (OPEX) (Averch and Johnson,
1962, cf.)). This approach is justified since in Norway we are dealing with
a situation where price-cap regulation had already been in place for a long
time before quality regulation was implemented so we can safely assume that
firms have allocated all the other inputs in a cost minimizing manner. With
our choice of inputs we thus model the trade-off of the firm: Either produce
with low cost and high outages or with high cost and low outages. Figure
3.3 shall illustrate this situation of the industry. The black rings mark the
input combinations of the different firms in the sample at given output and
8There is an extensive literature on how to treat undesired outputs in DEA, for a an
overview, see for example Dyckhoff and Allen (2001).
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Figure 3.3: The situation of the industry before and after the introduction
of quality regulation
the dashed line shows the minimum cost line that results without regulation,
that is, when a zero price is charged for outages9. Due to the location of
the minimum cost line we conjecture, in accordance with our hypotheses,
that the bulk of firms will have an input mix with relatively high outages
and relatively low TOTEX. When a price for outages is introduced, the
price line pivots and the cost minimizing point moves to the north west.
As a consequence, according to our hypotheses again, most firms will have
higher costs of production and will strive to reduce them by moving north
west as well by adapting their input mix accordingly10. In other words, they
want to achieve that their the expenditures for their new input mix at the
new prices (the social costs of outages were actually always there) are lower
9Please note that due to our empirical approach and the corresponding DEA-
methodology firms can be situated off the isoquant which is actually incommensurable
with standard microeconomic theory. We shall refer to Fare et al. (1998) for an overview
of the literature that deals with this feature of DEA.
10In the graph it is assumed that firms have no cost of outages at all, before the intro-
duction of the regulatory regime. In reality firms would, of course, consider lost turnover
and lost willingness to pay as quality deteriorates. Additionally, incentives to provide
quality change due to vertical structures as investigated by Buehler et al. (2004).
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than the expenditures for their old input mix valued at the new prices, i. e.
w1x2001 < w1x2005 (whether the firms were successful in this can be mea-
sured by the CM index as will be shown below).
It becomes clear then that by introducing a price for quality, the cost mini-
mization problem of the firm becomes equal to social cost minimization and
therefore detecting a movement as shown in figure 3.3 in our sample would
be sufficient to confirm our hypotheses for it would be due to the new regu-
lation, come along with lower social cost and lead to input mixes with fewer
outages.
In what follows it will therefore be shown how our indices can be used to
detect and analyse such a movement. To that end, consider figure 3.4, which
illustrates the situation of a firm (black rings) that moves from point Bt in
period t in direction north west to point Ct+1 in period t + 1. Here the iso-
quant results from the DEA-methodology as the piecewise linear convex hull
around the firms in the sample that show the least inputs at given output.
The minimum cost line is the result of the program in (3.9) when the new
price for quality is already in place. Finally, for illustrative purposes, it is
assumed here that there was no technological change between t and t+1 (so
that the isoquant didn’t move) and no price change (so that the minimum
cost line didn’t move).
The CM index, expressed in Euclidean distances11, is here the ratio OC/OG
OB/OE
and thus smaller than one. In other words, the firm has decreased its pro-
ducer cost so that hypothesis 1 can be confirmed here.
Moreover, by moving from Bt to Ct+1, the firm improves its allocative ef-
ficiency which is given by the ratios OE/OD and OG/OF in period t and
t+ 1 respectively. In the case illustrated, the firm moves parallel to the iso-
quant, which itself did not change, so there was neither a change in technical
efficiency, nor technical progress (TC and TEC would be close to one). As
input prices did not change either, PE would be equal to one as well. As a
consequence the AEC index which measures cost decreases due to changes
in the input mix is smaller than 1. In other words, it was indeed the substi-
11See Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004) for details on how to express the above indices
in distances.
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Figure 3.4: Malmquist indices and welfare changes
tution of TOTEX for outages that led to the increase in allocative efficiency
and thus the decrease in producer cost. As a consequence, here, hypothesis
2 can be verified as well12.
Putting it together, the decisive indices for our upcoming empirical analysis
are the CM and the AEC index: If their calculated values are smaller than
1 we can confirm our 2 hypotheses for the individual firm. In the aggregate,
we can confirm them if the following conditions hold:
N∑
i=1
(Social Costi,2001 ∗ CMi)
/
Social Cost2001 < 1 (3.12)
and
N∑
i=1
(Social Costi,2001 ∗ AECi)
/
Social Cost2001 < 1 (3.13)
12Apart from seeing the effect in the AEC measure, technological progress could also
indicate the effect of a quality scheme. This is due to the fact that our frontier is estimated
empirically which means it is defined by what firms actually do. By trying to improve
quality, the best firms would probably push the isoquant inward as well.
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Where Social Costi,t = TOTEXi,t + po t ∗ oi,t and (3.12) therefore gives the
relative change of the total social costs according to the CM index and (3.13)
gives the relative change of the total social costs according to the AEC index.
3.4 Data and choice of variables
3.4.1 Variables and model setup
To account for different aspects of the performance of a network provider,
we use three different outputs, namely the amount of energy delivered over
the network (MWh), the number of customers and network length. Using
the network length is not undisputed as a firm could theoretically add net-
work length and thereby increase its output in our case however, it is crucial
to measure geographical dispersion of customers. Moreover, our choice of
output variables largely follows Forsund and Kittelsen (1998) and Edvardsen
and Forsund (2003), who assessed the development of productivity of Scan-
dinavian electricity distribution firms. Our choice is also consistent with the
results of Korhonen and Syrja¨nen (2003) who investigated the appropriate-
ness of different inputs and outputs in great detail. As mentioned above,
two inputs, namely total expenditures (TOTEX) and ENS (i.e. outages),
were used, the first one in monetary terms as in Giannakis et al. (2005). In
order to be able to measure allocative efficiency concerning these 2 inputs
we treat TOTEX as a nummeraire such that its price equals 1 and use the
actual price for energy-not-supplied as estimated by the regulator. This way
we get a price-ratio between these two inputs which is necessary for further
calculations as described above.
3.4.2 Dataset
We used cost and output data of the fifty largest Norwegian distribution
system operators, published by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate (NVE). After having eliminated units with insufficient data qual-
ity, 31 DMUs (decision making units) were used for the calculation of our
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indices which we did for the periods 1999-2001, 1999-2005 and most impor-
tantly 2001-2005.
For the calculation of the TOTEX we need the operating expenditures (OPEX)
and capital expenditures (CAPEX). Our operating expenditures (OPEX)
comprise costs for network losses, wages and other costs. Following Korho-
nen and Syrja¨nen (2003) costs for transmission services were not included,
as they are beyond the control of a single unit. Our capital expenditures
(CAPEX) consist of depreciation plus the value of the assets multiplied with
the so called fair rate of return. The fair rate of return is set by the regu-
lator and serves as a reasonable approximation of the actual financing costs
of a firm. According to Grasto (1997) and Kinnunen (2003) the fair rate of
return which is used in Norway is the return of a medium term government
bond (risk free rate) plus a two percent risk premium, where debt and equity
are treated equally. The rate of return a regulator grants can be assumed
to be a reasonable approximation of the actual financing costs a firm faces.
Having a figure for annual capital expenditures allows us to compute total
expenditures (TOTEX) by adding OPEX and CAPEX.
As already mentioned in the previous section, the second input is energy-
not-supplied (ENS) which measures the amount of energy (in MWh) which
could not be delivered due to failures of the distribution system. To be more
precise, ENS measures how much energy customers would have used, if there
had been no failure by considering the typical load curve of customers and
the time of the outage. The development of the sum of ENS is shown in
figure 3.1.
We did not account for regional differences in factor costs, as our sample of
firms is very homogeneous. Moreover, the NVE already harmonized the data
extensively for their own benchmark studies.
In order to be able to consider allocative questions, we need an estimate
of outage costs, that is, the po in the above formulas. The cost of energy
not supplied (CENS) per MWh as investigated by the Norwegian regulatory
authority are given in Table 3.1. To get a price for ENS, we calculated the
average of the outage costs of different groups, weighted by their electric-
ity consumption. This value now represents the expected cost of an outage
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which occurs at any customer. This po was then discounted or inflated with
the Norwegian rate of inflation to get measures for the different years.
Customer Group Non-notified Notified
Industrial 8.25 5.75
Trade and Service 12.38 8.5
Agricultural 1.88 1.25
Residential 1 0.88
Public Service 1.63 1.25
Wood processing/energy intensive industries 1.63 1.38
Weighted average (by electricity consumption) 6.74
Table 3.1: Outage costs
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, in EUROs
3.5 Results13
The most important results of our investigation can be inferred from table
3.2 as it shows the aggregation of the individual results from the most im-
portant comparison 2001-2005 (the other results can be found in appendices
A. B.1, A. B.2 and A. B.3) in order to check whether equations (3.12) and
(3.13) hold. It can be seen from line “relative change” that indeed both these
conditions are fulfilled. In other words, our hypotheses from section 3.3.1 can
be confirmed: Quality regulation indeed induced companies to choose a more
socially favorable input mix, thereby decrease their costs of production and
thus to increase welfare. When looking at the geometric average of the re-
sults in table 3.3 (the detailed results can be found in appendices A. B.1
and A. B.3), we can, moreover, diagnose a few other things: The CM is
smaller than one in all three comparisons: Between 1999 and 2005 social
cost efficiency increased by almost 8 percent which cannot be attributed to
technical progress as this figure even shows a slight regress (TC = 1.02).
Also, the technical catch up factor TEC shows only a three percent increase
in efficiency.
Comparing the development of AEC before and after 2001 we observe that
13For calculating the LP-problems and the indices we used the free software package R.
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SC01 SC01
Firm Social Cost01 CM01.05 AEC01.05 ∗CM01.05 ∗AEC01.05
Alta Kraftlag AL 44220.84 0.83 1.05 36787.17 46299.28
Askoy Energi AS 27551.58 0.93 0.91 25641.46 25006.04
Bodo Energi AS 67827.65 1.13 0.98 76682.51 66223.13
Dalane energi IKS 53692.56 0.87 1.03 46665.46 55362.33
Eidefoss AS 49425.57 0.94 0.90 46398.87 44539.30
Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 53276.37 0.79 1.03 41856.29 54910.06
Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 102831.98 0.72 0.98 73811.76 100439.45
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 34689.11 1.21 1.02 41998.98 35290.91
Hadeland Energinett AS 65040.86 0.95 0.96 61518.20 62127.48
Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 53536.23 0.86 0.94 45933.75 50474.03
Halogaland Kraft AS 81103.98 0.89 1.01 71897.48 81897.30
Hammerfest Elverk Nett AS 34100.64 1.14 0.99 38855.53 33850.44
Haugaland Kraft AS 117702.97 1.48 1.00 174280.35 118032.46
HelgelandsKraft AS 237660.94 0.89 0.96 211886.07 227212.27
Klepp Energi AS 20754.11 1.00 1.16 20730.28 24105.33
Lier everk AS 33650.95 0.86 1.00 28790.03 33650.95
Lofotkraft AS 66079.09 0.84 1.03 55611.33 67871.22
Narvik Energinett AS 47740.15 1.13 0.98 54094.95 46613.29
Nordmore Energiverk AS 78536.33 1.06 0.84 82864.44 65582.71
Nord-Osterdal Kraftlag AL 34652.66 1.10 1.06 38279.52 36561.66
Notodden Energi AS 29043.99 0.92 0.92 26788.70 26705.01
Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 63172.29 1.22 0.94 77133.41 59207.35
Stange Energi Nett AS 41932.45 0.88 0.87 36722.62 36334.35
Sunnfjord Energi AS 54999.81 0.82 1.09 45188.20 60144.48
Tafjord Kraftnett AS 111933.04 0.98 0.99 109150.43 110612.91
Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 210732.13 0.66 0.94 138236.61 198230.62
Tussa Nett AS 122701.19 1.04 1.09 128210.26 134109.28
Valdres Energiverk AS 62752.93 0.81 0.97 51055.27 60692.06
Varanger Kraftnett AS 53137.19 1.45 1.00 77262.72 53254.12
Vesteralskraft Nett AS 50440.64 1.13 0.96 57162.44 48565.21
Sum 2104920.25 2021495.09 2063905.03
relative change 0.96 0.98
Table 3.2: The aggregation of Malmquist indices (2001-2005)
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CM
OEC CTC
CM IM TEC AEC TC PE
1999-2001
Geometric average 0.9595 1.0343 0.9538 0.9527 1.0844 0.9738
Standard deviation 0.2076 0.1523 0.1147 0.1568 0.0588 0.0632
Min 0.5292 0.6628 0.7228 0.6148 0.8625 0.8738
Max 1.5619 1.3030 1.2002 1.3625 1.1561 1.1991
2001-2005
Geometric average 0.9669 0.9673 1.0180 0.9805 0.9502 1.0163
Standard deviation 0.1940 0.2186 0.2295 0.0681 0.1218 0.0664
Min 0.6560 0.6637 0.7032 0.8351 0.6637 0.8657
Max 1.4807 1.4797 1.5613 1.1615 1.1246 1.2413
1999-2005
Geometric average 0.9266 0.9989 0.9710 0.9370 1.0287 0.9900
Standard deviation 0.2739 0.2789 0.2480 0.1506 0.1367 0.0945
Min 0.4841 0.4930 0.5718 0.5580 0.7447 0.7519
Max 1.6352 1.6263 1.5613 1.4049 1.2247 1.3439
Table 3.3: Summary of the main developments
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the bigger part of the advancement was made before 2001. The larger in-
crease in AEC-efficiency in the first period can be partly explained by the
methodology we have used. To see why, consider figure 3.4 again and note
that an input-mix change has a much stronger effect on the change in alloca-
tive efficiency if the firm is originally located further in the south eastern part
of the graph. After 2001, AEC was the second largest source of productivity
progress and there occurred a frontier shift (TC). Therefore firms moved the
estimated frontier outward by either reducing quality slacks or by investing
in technology to produce less outages at lower costs.
An alternative way to interpret the results is by remembering that OEC
measures the amount by which firms came closer to the price line. In the
period 1999-2001 decreases in OEC can be attributed equally to technical
catch up (TEC) and changes in the input mix (AEC). After the introduc-
tion of quality regulation, however, changes in the input mix, were the only
driving force with the increase of OEC-efficiency (i.e. only (AEC) was below
1, whereas TEC was above 1).
Apart from the effect of quality regulation there are other interesting observa-
tions to be made as well. Between 1999 and 2001, efficiency mainly increased
because firms converged to the efficiency frontier. This could be due to the
recently (1997) introduced introduced price cap regulation which is supposed
to promote convergence in efficiency. After 2001 technical progress was again
the driving force in efficiency.
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3.6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to provide further arguments on the usefulness of
price-cap and quality regulation, not only in terms of an increase in quality,
but in terms of allocative efficiency and welfare. Since our intention was to
approach this issue in a positive instead of a normative fashion we had a look
at Norway as it was a pioneer with both these types of regulation.
Specifically we wanted to answer two main questions: First, did welfare in
Norway increase since the introduction of quality regulation in 2001 and
second, to what extend can a potential such welfare increase actually be
attributed to the new regulation-regime? To that end, it was shown in an
economic framework that a decrease in the aggregate producer cost of elec-
tricity suppliers is a sufficient condition for such a welfare increase given that
the amount of outages decrease and sold quantities increase in the aggregate.
Accordingly, the following 2 hypotheses were formulated:
Hypothesis 1 After the introduction of quality regulation in Norway, the
social cost of electricity distribution decreased. By referring to our
welfare framework this means, that welfare increased.
Hypothesis 2 The decrease of the social costs and the increase in quality
are due to the new regulation regime in that, by charging a price for
outages, it induced electricity companies to substitute cost for outages
in a more socially favorable manner.
It was then shown, how Malmquist indices can be used to check these hy-
potheses and afterwards these indices were calculated for a representative
sample of Norwegian distribution system operators.
The evaluation of the achieved results led to a clear confirmation of our hy-
potheses so that we can say: It was indeed quality regulation that induced
firms to behave in a socially more optimal way such that welfare on the whole
increased. A corollary result is that with the prior pure price cap regulation
regime quality cannot have been optimal, sice otherwise welfare would not
have increased with increasing quality. Our results have implications for
regulatory policy. If quality can be observed and contractually specified it
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might well be worthwhile to directly regulate it even if regulation is costly
as suggested by Buehler et al. (2006).
Appendices
A. A The aggregation of welfare changes
The aggregated GS at time t looks as follows:
GSt =
N∑
i=1
∫ yi,2
0
Pi(y, q(o)) dy
Between two points in time (t = 1, 2), welfare changes are as follows:
∆GS12 =
N∑
i=1
(
∫ yi,2
yi,1
Pi(y, q(o1))dy +
∫ yi,2
0
∂2Pi(y, q(o1))
∂q∂o
∆o12dy)
Where the first integral accounts for welfare changes due to quantity changes
and the second integral depicts the effect of outages which have an effect via
long run quality that increases the willingness to pay. We now introduce the
assumption ∂
2Pi(·)
∂q∂o
= ∂
2P (·)
∂q∂o
∀i as described in section 3.3.1.
GS12 ≈
N∑
i=1
(Pi(·)∆y12) +
∂2P (·)
∂q∂o
N∑
i=1
y2i∆o12
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A. B Malmquist-indices
A. B.1 1999 to 2001
1999-2001 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.91 0.87 1.04 0.99 0.88 1.06 0.99 1.04
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.53 0.51 1.04 0.83 0.61 1.12 0.93 0.93
Bodo.Energi.AS 0.87 0.82 1.05 0.89 0.93 1.08 0.98 0.96
Dalane.Elverk 1.02 0.98 1.03 0.72 1.36 0.97 1.07 0.7
Eidefoss.AS 1.1 1 1.1 1.04 0.96 1.09 1.01 1.14
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.99 0.95 1.05 0.97 0.97 1.15 0.91 1.11
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.86 0.8 1.07 0.75 1.07 1.07 1 0.81
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.08 1 1.08 1 1 1.05 1.03 1.05
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 1.05 1 1.06 1.05 0.95 1.16 0.91 1.21
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 1.3 1.2 1.08 1.13 1.06 1.13 0.96 1.28
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.93 0.87 1.06 0.92 0.95 1.09 0.97 1
Hammerfest.E.verk.DA 0.61 0.6 1.03 0.87 0.69 1.13 0.91 0.99
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.05 1 1.05 1 1 1.11 0.94 1.11
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 1.1 1.01 1.08 1 1.02 1.14 0.95 1.14
Klepp.Energi.AS 0.96 1 0.96 1 1 1.1 0.87 1.1
Lier.everk.AS 0.94 0.98 0.95 1 0.98 1.05 0.91 1.05
Lofotkraft.AS 0.76 0.7 1.09 1.01 0.69 1.12 0.98 1.13
Narvik.Energi.AS 0.85 0.81 1.05 1 0.81 1.12 0.94 1.12
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.01 0.95 1.07 0.78 1.21 1.09 0.98 0.85
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.02 0.94 1.09 1 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.01
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.77 0.74 1.03 0.77 0.96 0.86 1.2 0.66
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.35 1.26 1.07 1.18 1.07 1.11 0.97 1.3
Stange.Energi.AS 1.56 1.47 1.06 1.2 1.22 1.08 0.99 1.29
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.85 0.78 1.1 1 0.77 1.09 1 1.1
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.95 0.9 1.05 0.94 0.96 1.08 0.97 1.02
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 1.15 1.06 1.09 1 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.06
Tussa.Nett.AS 0.79 0.75 1.06 0.84 0.89 1.07 0.99 0.91
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 1.18 1.08 1.09 0.99 1.1 1.13 0.97 1.12
Varanger.Kraft.AS 0.88 0.86 1.03 1 0.86 1.12 0.92 1.12
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.01 0.93 1.08 0.95 0.98 1.15 0.94 1.08
Mgeom 0.96 0.91 1.06 0.95 0.95 1.08 0.97 1.03
Mavrg 0.98 0.93 1.06 0.96 0.97 1.09 0.98 1.04
SD 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.06 20.96
Min 0.53 0.51 0.95 0.72 0.61 0.86 0.87 0.99
Max 1.56 1.47 1.1 1.2 1.36 1.16 1.2 0.96
Table 3.4: Malmquist-indices for the period 1999 to 2001
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A. B.2 2001 to 2005
2001-2005 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.83 0.74 1.13 0.7 1.05 1.02 1.11 0.72
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.93 1.1 0.84 1.21 0.91 0.78 1.08 0.95
Bodo.Energi.AS 1.13 1.52 0.75 1.55 0.98 0.75 0.99 1.17
Dalane.Elverk 0.87 0.82 1.07 0.79 1.03 0.86 1.24 0.68
Eidefoss.AS 0.94 0.9 1.04 1 0.9 1.01 1.03 1.01
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.79 0.78 1.01 0.76 1.03 0.94 1.08 0.71
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.72 0.9 0.79 0.92 0.98 0.72 1.1 0.67
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.21 1.1 1.1 1.08 1.02 1.11 0.99 1.2
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 0.95 0.93 1.01 0.98 0.96 1.02 0.99 1
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 0.86 0.83 1.03 0.88 0.94 1.03 1 0.91
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.89 0.82 1.08 0.81 1.01 1.09 1 0.88
Hammerfest.Elektrisitetsverk.DA 1.14 1.12 1.02 1.13 0.99 1.01 1 1.14
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.48 1.57 0.95 1.56 1 0.93 1.01 1.46
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 0.89 0.86 1.04 0.9 0.96 1.05 0.99 0.94
Klepp.Energi.AS 1 1.16 0.86 1 1.16 0.99 0.87 0.99
Lier.everk.AS 0.86 1 0.86 1 1 0.88 0.97 0.88
Lofotkraft.AS 0.84 0.79 1.06 0.77 1.03 1.08 0.98 0.83
Narvik.Energi.AS 1.13 1.36 0.83 1.4 0.98 0.84 0.99 1.17
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.06 1.06 0.99 1.27 0.84 0.93 1.06 1.19
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.1 1.07 1.04 1.01 1.06 1.09 0.95 1.1
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.92 0.99 0.93 1.08 0.92 1 0.94 1.07
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.22 1.17 1.04 1.25 0.94 1.03 1.01 1.29
Stange.Energi.AS 0.88 0.9 0.97 1.04 0.87 0.99 0.98 1.03
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.82 0.78 1.05 0.72 1.09 1.05 1 0.75
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.98 1.17 0.84 1.18 0.99 0.78 1.07 0.92
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.66 0.94 0.7 1 0.94 0.66 1.05 0.66
Tussa.Nett.AS 1.04 1.02 1.03 0.93 1.09 0.96 1.07 0.9
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 0.81 0.8 1.02 0.82 0.97 1.03 0.99 0.85
Varanger.Kraft.AS 1.45 1.32 1.1 1.32 1 1.12 0.98 1.48
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.13 1.13 1 1.17 0.96 0.99 1.02 1.16
Mgeom 0.97 1 0.97 1.02 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.97
Mavrg 0.98 1.02 0.97 1.04 0.99 0.96 1.02 0.98
SD 0.19 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.07 42.89
Min 0.66 0.74 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.66 0.87 0.91
Max 1.48 1.57 1.13 1.56 1.16 1.12 1.24 1.03
Table 3.5: Individual Malmquist-indices for the period 2001 to 2005
CHAPTER 3. PRICE-CAP REGULATION AND QUALITY 56
A. B.3 1999 to 2005
1999-2005 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.73 0.64 1.14 0.69 0.93 1.09 1.04 0.76
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.48 0.56 0.86 1.01 0.56 0.92 0.93 0.93
Bodo.Energi.AS 0.97 1.25 0.78 1.38 0.91 0.82 0.94 1.13
Dalane.Elverk 0.93 0.8 1.16 0.57 1.4 0.86 1.34 0.49
Eidefoss.AS 1.03 0.9 1.14 1.04 0.86 1.09 1.05 1.13
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.79 0.74 1.07 0.73 1 0.97 1.1 0.71
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.58 0.72 0.8 0.7 1.04 0.85 0.95 0.59
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.32 1.1 1.21 1.08 1.02 1.21 1 1.3
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 0.98 0.93 1.05 1.03 0.91 1.12 0.93 1.15
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 1.13 1 1.13 1 1 1.09 1.04 1.09
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.84 0.72 1.17 0.75 0.96 1.21 0.96 0.9
Hammerfest.Elektrisitetsverk.DA 0.69 0.67 1.03 0.98 0.68 1.15 0.89 1.13
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.54 1.57 0.99 1.56 1 1.04 0.95 1.63
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 0.98 0.87 1.13 0.89 0.97 1.21 0.94 1.08
Klepp.Energi.AS 0.96 1.17 0.82 1 1.17 1.1 0.75 1.1
Lier.everk.AS 0.82 0.98 0.83 1 0.98 0.83 0.99 0.83
Lofotkraft.AS 0.62 0.55 1.13 0.78 0.71 1.21 0.94 0.94
Narvik.Energi.AS 0.89 1.1 0.81 1.39 0.79 0.85 0.94 1.19
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.06 1.01 1.05 1 1.01 1.07 0.98 1.07
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.13 1 1.14 1.01 0.99 1.12 1.02 1.12
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.75 0.73 1.02 0.83 0.89 0.96 1.06 0.8
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.64 1.48 1.11 1.47 1 1.06 1.04 1.56
Stange.Energi.AS 1.4 1.32 1.06 1.25 1.06 1.1 0.97 1.37
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.7 0.61 1.14 0.72 0.85 1.12 1.03 0.8
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.93 1.05 0.89 1.11 0.95 0.87 1.02 0.96
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.78 1 0.78 1 1 0.74 1.05 0.74
Tussa.Nett.AS 0.82 0.76 1.08 0.79 0.97 1.03 1.05 0.81
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 0.96 0.86 1.11 0.81 1.06 1.15 0.96 0.94
Varanger.Kraft.AS 1.27 1.13 1.13 1.32 0.86 1.22 0.92 1.61
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.15 1.05 1.1 1.11 0.95 1.06 1.03 1.18
Mgeom 0.93 0.91 1.02 0.97 0.94 1.03 0.99 1
Mavrg 0.96 0.94 1.03 1 0.95 1.04 0.99 1.02
SD 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.09 19.24
Min 0.48 0.55 0.78 0.57 0.56 0.74 0.75 1.15
Max 1.64 1.57 1.21 1.56 1.4 1.22 1.34 0.87
Table 3.6: Malmquist-indices for the period 1999 to 2005
Chapter 4
Price-cap Regulation And The
Correct Cost Of Capital:
Comparing The Credit Default Risk
Of The Electricity- And
Telecom-Industries With DEA1
Abstract
To answer the important question whether there is a significant difference
in the credit default risk of the electricity and the telecom industry, in this
paper a Data Envelopment Analysis-method is developed by which the credit-
worthiness of industries can be compared. The application of this method to
European data led to a clear rejection of the hypothesis that the two groups
belong to the same population, so that the electricity industry indeed has a
lower credit default risk than the telecom industry.
1This paper has been presented at the
• INFRADAY-Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research, Oct. 2007, Berlin
and is accepted for the
• 5th International Conference on the European Electricity Market (EEM 08), May
2008, Lisbon.
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4.1 Introduction
A very practical and frequent problem of electricity regulators in the preva-
lent price-cap regulation regime is an accurate assessment of the cost of cap-
ital of the regulated companies in order to be able to prescribe prices that
permit the firms an adequate return on their employed capital. To this end,
authorities usually calculate the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
whose ingredients are, put simply, the distribution of equity and debt and
the respective interest rates.
Notions about what level of the WACC is indeed adequate naturally differ,
depending on the perspective. Electricity operators often claim that they
face the same risk as the telecom industry and should therefore be granted
the same risk-adaptation in the calculation of the WACCs. Electricity regu-
lators, on the other hand, dispute that and usually prescribe lower WACCs
than telecom regulators2. Or as Knieps Knieps (2003) puts it (translated
from German):
The higher business risk in the dynamic, competitive telecom-
sector compared to the rather stationary, monopolistic sectors of
electricity[, water and airports] is acknowledged throughout the
British regulatory authorities.
In principle, this view of electricity regulators is based on the following:
Inferring from the methodology of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), a
few empirical studies3 have shown that the systematic risk of telecom enter-
prises is higher than that of electricity enterprises (i. e. telecom enterprises
have a higher β). This higher overall systematic risk of the telecom industry
implies that its WACC needs to be higher, either because of a higher interest
rate for equity or for debt or both (reflecting that the holders of equity and
debt have to be compensated for their higher risk exposure).
2Research (cf. 2006), where the WACC of the electricity- and the telecom-industries of
most European countries can be found (in German only).
3A. Damodaran’s comprehensive database (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar)
for example records for the U.S. an average β between 2000-2006 of 0.74 for the electric
utilities industry and of 1.49 for the telecom services industry
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In practice, regulators in most countries argue that in both industries enter-
prises can manage their debt in such a way that its cost, i. e. the interest
rate, is equal to the risk free rate (i. e. government bonds)4. Therefore
the higher risk exposure of the telecom industry, indicated by the higher β,
is reflected only in a higher supposed interest rate for equity in the WACC
whereas the interest rates for debt in both industries are usually supposed
to be the same.
In other words: Up to now the prescribed WACCs of the electricity and
telecom industries in practically every European country differed solely due
to supposed differences in the cost of equity whereas these industries were
treated uniformly concerning their cost of debt. Even when leaving aside
methodological criticisms of the CAPM-model, this practice can be regarded
as a stark simplification, especially when considering the fact that since the
imposition of the BASLE II -agreement the individual cost of debt is increas-
ingly dependent on the banks’ ratings of the respective firm and therefore
the default risk they assign to it.
The principal question that is to be addressed in this paper is therefore
whether this simplification of electricity regulators is indeed justified or do
systematic differences in the credit default risk of the electricity- and telecom-
industries call for a differential treatment concerning their cost of debt.
In order to answer this question aData Envelopment Analysis (DEA)-technique
is applied with the following approach: Take a few (simple) risk-relevant fi-
nancial ratios, categorize them into input- and output-figures and determine
whether the firm can achieve bigger outputs with given inputs, thereby in-
dicating a lower credit-default risk, relative to the other firms in the sam-
ple. Equipped with these relative credit-default risks (or efficiency scores) a
rank-sum-test is performed to find out whether the electricity industry has
a significantly lower default risk than the telecom industry.
Since the problem of evaluating the credit default risk of firms is ultimately
the task of a bank’s credit scoring system, in what follows, a brief background
of the techniques that are applied in this field will be provided and argued
4For a discussion of the undesirable consequences of this practice see Bogner and Ram-
merstorfer (2007).
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why DEA is a suitable extension or alternative to more conventional methods
such as multiple discriminant analysis.
4.2 Background: Credit Scoring
A bank’s decision upon whether or not to lend money to firms and at what
price (i. e. the interest rate) is based on a prediction of the risk of the firm’s
corporate failure, i. e. the credit risk. The bank’s internal credit risk models
evaluate a potential client’s credit risk by assessing his ability to repay. In
the last 2-3 decades an extensive literature has emerged on the prediction of
business failure and the development of credit scoring systems (cf. Altman
(1968), Beaver (1966), Dimitras et al. (1996) or Dimitras et al. (1999) cited
in Emel et al. (2003)). Since the client’s current financial situation is a very
important (but not the only) determinant of corporate failure, financial ra-
tios are amongst the oldest and most popular ingredients in credit scoring.
Of course financial ratio analysis has its limitations, amongst which very im-
portant ones are the fact that it is difficult to make an unequivocal judgment
about whether a particular ratio is “good” or “bad” and that a firm may be
good at some ratios and bad in others so that it is difficult to classify it as
altogether strong or weak5 (cf. Emel et al., 2003, p. 105).
To overcome these limitations by creating a composite empirical indicator
of financial ratios, discriminant analysis (DA) was introduced in the late
1960s. Using univariate analysis techniques, Beaver Beaver (1966) developed
an indicator with financial ratios that best differentiated between failed and
non-failed firms (cf. Emel et al., 2003, p. 105). This univariate approach
was later extended and improved by Altman (1968) to the multivariate mul-
tiple discriminant analysis (MDA). Between the 1960s and the late 1990s
researchers attempted to increase the accuracy and success of MDA and de-
veloped and applied new techniques for failure prediction such as logit and
probit-models, recursive partitioning algorithms (RPA) based on a binary
classification rationale and decision support systems (DSS) in conjunction
5An overview of the potential and limitations of financial ratio analysis can be found
in Weston and Bringham (1993).
CHAPTER 4. PRICE-CAP AND COST OF CAPITAL 61
with the paradigm of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) Emel et al.
(see 2003, p. 106) for a comprehensive overview of the developments and a
literature survey).
From the late 1990s on data envelopment analysis (DEA) was introduced to
the field of failure prediction as in Troutt et al. (1996), Simak (1997) and
Cielen et al. (2004).
4.2.1 DEA and Credit Scoring
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) as pioneered by Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes Charnes et al. (1979) is a non-parametric method to estimate the ef-
ficiency of enterprises. Its popularity stems from the fact that it can specify
an efficient frontier without the need for the definition of a production func-
tion by laying a convex hull around the empirically available input-output
combinations of the players in the sample. Following Farrell’s Farrell (1957)
pioneering approach, efficiency of the respective enterprise can then, for ex-
ample, be measured by the distance between the observation and the esti-
mated ideal on the efficient frontier. Mathematically, this is accomplished by
formulating for each enterprise a linear program in which the objective func-
tion represents the efficiency of the respective enterprise and the constraints
stand for the restrictions of the production possibility set.
In the context of credit scoring those financial ratios that should be as small
as possible would serve as inputs and those ratios that should be as big
as possible would serve as outputs. Moreover, the “efficiency” (a numerical
value) of each firm in this environment is equivalent with its credit worthiness
relative to the “leaders” (i. e. the firms with the lowest credit default-risk)
in the bank’s portfolio. Therefore, throughout this paper the expressions
“efficiency” and “relative credit worthiness” will be used interchangeably.
DEA has several advantages to the above mentioned parametric approaches:
It naturally provides a single measure of performance by simultaneously han-
dling multiple inputs and outputs without making judgments on their relative
importance, whereas with MDA, for example, an ultimately arbitrary aggre-
gation of the different ratios is necessary to achieve such a single measure
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(cf. Simak, 1997). Furthermore, no specification of a functional form for the
input-output correspondences is required (cf. Paradi et al., 2004). In an ap-
plication, Simak Simak (1997) shows for example that the DEA approach
achieves at least as good results as the existing discriminant analysis-based
“Z-score” approach and in most cases even outperformed it.
The main reason, however, why it is necessary to look for alternative ways
to classify credit default risks in the present case, is that in the electricity
and telecom industries the vast majority of the enterprises are huge, used
to be owned by the state until not too long ago and/or are mostly natural
monopolists in that they control the essential facility of the network. As
a consequence, actual failures hardly ever occur so that the paired sample
tests6 that are used in most of the conventional bankruptcy prediction mod-
els are practically not applicable.
Emel et al. Emel et al. (2003) therefore use a DEA-based methodology to
calculate a “credibility score” of 82 industrial/manufacturing firms in the
credit portfolio of one of Turkey’s largest commercial banks. They validate
their results by regression and discriminant analyses and expert judgments.
In what follows a DEA-based approach will be developed that is similar to
Emel et al. (2003)’s but specifically geared to enable the comparison of the
credit risk of two such industries and incorporates expert opinions in a more
sophisticated way.
4.3 The method
In this section the methodology for this investigation will be developed. It
consists of four main aspects:
1. Finding a suitable DEA-model.
2. Identification of suitable financial ratios.
3. Gathering expert opinions about the relative importance of the selected
ratios and incorporation into the selected DEA-model.
6which are based on a data set consisting half of failed and half of non-failed companies
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4. Using the results of the selected DEA-model to compare the default risk
of the telecom and the electricity industry as a whole with a so-called
rank-sum test.
4.3.1 Finding a suitable DEA-model
The DEA-model has to fulfill three main requirements:
(REQ1) Allow for input- and output-maximization simultaneously,
(REQ2) come up with an efficiency-value for each firm that is invariant to
the units of measure and
(REQ3) enable the restriction of permissible ratios between the different in-
and outputs in the solution.
(REQ1) is necessary to ensure that inputs (in the context of credit scoring
those financial ratios that should be as small as possible) and outputs (ratios
that should be as big as possible) are treated equally. This requirement
disqualifies models such as and kin to the original formulation of Charnes
et al. (1979), referred to as the CCR-model, because here, a prior choice
between input-(minimize inputs with given outputs) or output-orientation
(maximize outputs with given inputs) and thus an undesired prioritization
has to be made.
(REQ2) is a prerequisite for the performance of the ensuing rank-sum test.
Due to this requirement, the main alternative to the CCR-model, the so-
called additive model (ADD) (cf. Cooper et al., 2000, p. 91) is not applicable.
(REQ3) caters for the aim to include expert opinions in the optimization
process in order to impede extreme solutions (i. e. a firm being efficient that
is very good at one ratio but very very bad at all the other ratios).
The only model that satisfies (REQ1) and (REQ2) simultaneously is the so-
called slack based measure of efficiency-model (SBM), as discussed in Cooper
et al. (2000, p. 96 f.). To enhance it for (REQ3) as well, it will be modified
as described in the next section.
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The modified SBM-model
In order to estimate the efficiency of firm o, the following fractional program
in λ, s−, s+, pi and τ is formulated:
min
λ,s−,s+,pi,τ
ρ =
1− 1
m
∑m
i=1 s
−
i /xio
1 + 1
s
∑s
r=1 s
+
i /yro
s.t. Xλ+ s− − Ppi = xo
Y λ− s+ +Qτ = yo
λ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0, s+ ≥ 0, pi ≤ 0
and τ ≥ 0
(4.1)
where xo and yo are the in- and output-vectors of firm o, X and Y are the in-
and output-matrices of the the entire sample, m is the number of inputs, s
is the number of outputs, λ is a vector of weights, s− and s+ are the vectors
of in- and output-slacks, P and Q are the matrices of in- and output-weight-
restrictions and finally pi and τ the respective vectors of weights7.
It is easy to see that an increase in either s−i or s
+
r , ceteris paribus, will
decrease the objective value ρ, and, indeed, in a strictly, monotone manner.
This means, on the other hand, that (REQ1) is satisfied.
Moreover, the objective function value ρ ∈ [0, 1] for every firm and, since
both the numerator and the denominator are measured in the same units for
every item in the objective of (4.1), the objective function value ρ is invariant
to the unit of measurement of each input and output item so that (REQ2)
is indeed satisfied (cf. Cooper et al. (2000, p. 97) for proofs). Once again:
This ρ, the efficiency of each company, is equivalent to its relative credit
worthiness in our context.
The matrices P and Q together with their weights pi and τ finally ensure
that (REQ3) is satisfied, as will be shown in section 4.3.1.
First, however, it will be shown below, how (4.1) can be transformed into a
linear program to make it solvable.
7This model is identical with the standard SBM-model apart from the weight-
restriction-matrices and their respective weights Ppi and Qτ .
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Linearizing the modified SBM-model
Following (Cooper et al., 2000, p. 71) a positive scalar variable t is introduced
such that
t
(
1 +
1
s
s∑
r=1
s+i /yro
)
= 1.
This way (4.1) becomes:
min
t,λ,s−,s+,pi,τ
θ = t− s−
1
m
xoImem
s.t. t+ s+
1
s
yoIses = 1
txo −Xλ− s
− + Ppi = 0
tyo − Y λ+ s
+ −Qτ = 0
t ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0, s+ ≥ 0, pi ≤ 0
and τ ≥ 0
(4.2)
where Im and Is are m- resp. s-dimensional identity matrices and em and es
are m- resp. s-dimensional vectors of ones.
By introducing
Λ = tλ, S− = ts−, S+ = ts+, Π = tpi and T = tτ
(4.2) is transformed to:
min
t,Λ,S−,S+,Π,T
θ = t− S−
1
m
xoImem
s.t. t+ S+
1
s
yoIses = 1
txo −XΛ− S
− + PΠ = 0
tyo − Y Λ + S
+ −QT = 0
t ≥ 0, Λ ≥ 0, S− ≥ 0, S+ ≥ 0,
Π ≤ 0 and T ≥ 0
(4.3)
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Since t > 0, the transformation is reversible so that from an optimal solution
to (4.3), (θ∗, t∗, Λ∗, S−∗, S+∗), the optimal solution to (4.1) can be derived
by
ρ∗ = θ∗, λ∗ = Λ∗/t∗, s−∗ = S−∗/t∗, s−∗ = S+∗/t∗.
This relatively simple to solve linear program will be the basis of all further
calculations. As mentioned above, the matrices P and Q are responsible
for restricting the permissible ratios between the different optimal in- and
outputs. In what follows, it will be shown how exactly this is accomplished.
Restricting weights
It is necessary to have a look at the dual of (4.3):
max
u0,v,u
u0
s.t. u0 + vxo + uyo ≥ 1
− vX − uY ≥ 0
− v ≥ −
1
m
xoImem
1
s
yoIsesu0 + u ≥ 0
vP ≤ 0
uQ ≤ 0
u0, v and u . . . free in sign
(4.4)
where u0 is a scalar and v and u are the vectors of in- and output-weights
that the program chooses to maximize the ratio between out- and inputs.
In order to achieve that the ratios between the different optimal weights
(v∗, u∗) don’t exceed pre-determined upper and lower bounds, the following
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bunch of constraints is added to (4.4)8:
li,i+j ≤
vi+j
vi
≤ ui,i+j i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Li,i+j ≤
ui+j
ui
≤ Ui,i+j i ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , s}
where the different ls and us (Ls and Us) are the pre-determined lower- and
upper bounds9 of the various ratios between the different inputs (outputs).
It is easily verified that this is equivalent to setting
P =

l12 −u12 l13 −u13 . . . . . . . . .
−1 1 0 0 . . . . . . . . .
0 0 −1 1 . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l(m−1)m −u(m−1)m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −1 1

(
m×
(
m
2
))
and
Q =

L12 −U12 L13 −U13 . . . . . . . . .
−1 1 0 0 . . . . . . . . .
0 0 −1 1 . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L(s−1)s −U(s−1)s
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −1 1

(
s×
(
s
2
))
in (4.4).
Having specified a suitable DEA-model, selecting suitable financial ratios is
8This is equivalent to the so-called assurance-region approach (AR) (cf. Cooper et al.,
2000, p. 152).
9In section 4.3.3 it will be shown how expert-opinions can be mapped into such upper
and lower bounds.
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the next step in the methodology.
4.3.2 Selecting relevant financial ratios
The task of selecting the “right” financial ratios for credit scoring is tricky as
there is an abundance of candidates and a voluminous literature deals with
what dimensions have to be considered.
For this investigation two particular aspects are influential:
1. Since a main component of the approach at hand is the inclusion of
expert opinions on the relative importance of the ratios that are even-
tually included, any initial choice of ratios will be relativized. In other
words, the inclusion of expert opinions makes the results less sensitive
to an initial choice that includes irrelevant or otherwise “wrong” ratios.
Moreover, as the ultimate purpose of this paper is a practical answer
to an empirical question, a theoretical discussion on the pros and cons
of particular ratios would be beyond its scope.
As a consequence, the choice of ratios should be as broadly and easily
accepted as possible and able to stand the test in practice.
2. Even experts can make a reasonable judgment on the relative impor-
tance of only a limited number of ratios.
As a consequence the selection of ratios shall be as small as possible.
A way to satisfy all these desires could be found with the help of the cen-
tral bank of the Republic of Austria, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank
(OeNB)10. The OeNB uses sophisticated sector-specific LOGIT-models to
predict the probability of default one year ahead of a sample of 4000-5000
medium and large sized companies. Having data from 1981 onwards, these
models achieve a very high AUROC11 between 0.8 and 0.9, depending on the
industry.
10I sincerely want to thank Dr. Gerhard Winkler of the OeNB for his help
11= the area below the ROC(=“receiver operator characteristic”)-curve: an indicator
of the performance of the model. A value of 0.5 means that the model is no better than
a random guess whereas 1 means a perfect forecast (cf. Blochlinger and Leippold, 2006)
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According to qualitative considerations, the OeNB first classifies all pos-
sible financial-ratio candidates (392) into the categories “liquidity”, “prof-
itability”, “expense-structure”, “management-quality”, “financial analysis”,
“turnover” and “investment-analysis”. After that, the number of financial-
ratios is successively reduced based on a methodology well-established in the
EURO-zone. It involves
1. univariate tests of discriminatory power,
2. tests on multicollinearity and
3. an econometric derivation of the eventual selection of the financial ra-
tios.
For the present case, those financial-ratios were finally chosen that have the
highest discriminatory power in the above categories as follows:
• Outputs (ratios to be maximized):
1. Liquidity: operating cash flow
current liabilities
2. Profitability: profit before tax∗100
balance sheet total
3. Expense-structure: profit before tax∗100
interest and similar expenses
4. Management-quality: profit before tax
employees
5. Financial analysis: equity∗100
balance sheet total
6. Investment analysis: monetary current assets-current liabilities
balance sheet total
• Inputs (ratios to be minimized):
1. Turnover: trade accounts payable∗360
turnover
Having determined the relevant financial ratios, it will be described below,
how expert-opinions can be gathered and mapped into the upper and lower
bounds as described in section 4.3.1.
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4.3.3 Gathering expert opinions12
As discussed in section 4.3.1, the aim of asking experts for their opinions
about the relative importance of the various financial ratios, was to determine
upper and lower bounds of their relative weights in the solutions.
In order to be utilizable for the analysis at hand, these judgments need to be
available in a normalized way, i.e. the result should be something like table
4.1. For illustrative purposes let the weight for ratio r be ur (r= 1, 2, 3, 4), in
Expert Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 3 Ratio 4 Sum
Expert 1 1.67 3.33 1.67 3.33 10
Expert 2 2.11 3.16 1.58 3.16 10
Expert 3 2.5 1.88 1.88 3.75 10
Expert 4 2 2 2 4 10
Expert 5 2.4 1.9 1.9 3.8 10
Average 2.14 2.45 1.81 3.61 10
Table 4.1: Fictitious table of normalized weights
Source: (Cooper et al., 2000, p. 171)
accordance with section 4.3.1. Therefore, u2 = 3.33 of expert 1 means that
he puts a weight of 33.3% on Ratio 2 when evaluating the credit-worthiness
of a firm based on these 4 (fictitious) financial ratios. The ratio u2/u1 =
3.33/1.67 = 2 for expert 1, 3.16/2.11=1.5 for expert 2, 1.88/2.5=0.75 for
expert 3, 2.00/2.00 for expert 4 and 1.9/2.4=0.79 for expert 5. Thus, I have
the following range of the ratio u2/u1:
0.75 ≤ u2/u1 ≤ 2,
where 0.75 and 2 would be the L12 and the U12 of section 4.3.1. In the same
way we can find the Lij and Uij for each pair (i, j) and thus all required data
for the P - (Q-) matrix of section 4.3.1.
In principle, the experts could be asked about the relative importance of the
various financial ratios directly (i.e. to fill in the numbers in the above table
such that the sum of 10 results). The problem with that is, however, that it
is difficult to consistently compare more than, say, 3 ratios like that. Saaty’s
12This section is largely taken from (Cooper et al., 2000, p. 171 f.)
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Saaty (1980) analytic hierarchy process (AHP) provides an elegant solution
to this problem in that it creates a normalized weight-vector as in table 4.1
solely from each expert’s pairwise comparison of the different financial-ratios.
In other words, equipped with AHP, all the required data to construct the P -
and Q-matrices (as discussed in section 4.3.1) can be gathered conveniently
for it allows the creation of simple questionnaires, in which a proband only
needs to successively compare all possible pairs of financial-ratios.
With this, all the necessary ingredients to calculate DEA-efficiency scores,
i.e. credit-default risks, are available. Therefore, in what follows, the last
missing bit of the methodology, namely the comparison of the credit-default
risk of entire industries based on such DEA-scores, will be explained.
4.3.4 Comparing the efficiency of 2 industries
As already mentioned above, the main purpose of this paper is to check the
hypothesis that the electricity-industry is characterized by a lower credit-
default risk than the telecom-industry. This hypothesis implicitly presumes
that the telecom- and the electricity-industry have different technologies, i.e.
different efficient frontiers, so that efficiencies inferred from a pooled sample
nor from distinct samples should be compared directly. If it was found out,
however, that electricity firms are on average closer to the efficiency frontier
of the telecom-industry than vice versa, strong evidence would nevertheless
be added to the above hypothesis.
Hence, the following approach is taken:
Calculate the efficiency of each firm when evaluated with the technology of
the other industry. Rank the thus obtained efficiencies of all firms in the
sample and perform a so-called rank-sum test to check whether the ranking
of electricity firms is statistically significantly better than that of the telecom
firms.
In what follows therefore, it will first be outlined how the above described
DEA-model needs to be adapted to manage such bilateral comparisons and
then the functioning of the rank-sum test will be explained.
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Adapting the DEA-model for bilateral comparisons
Based on (4.3), the following model is formulated:
min
t,Λ,S−,S+,Π,T
θ = t− S−
1
m
xaImem
s.t. t+ S+
1
s
yaIses = 1
txa − [Xb, xa] Λ− S
− + PΠ = 0
tya − [Yb, ya] Λ + S
+ −QT = 0
t ≥ 0, Λ ≥ 0, S− ≥ 0, S+ ≥ 0,
Π ≤ 0 and T ≥ 0
(4.5)
This way it is made sure that each firm a of industry A is only compared
with the technology of the other industry B and its efficiency ρ of (4.1) is
still bounded by 0 and 1. Figure 4.1 is supposed to illustrate the concept
with the input-minimization-part of the fictitious case of 2 inputs and one
output13. The program determines the maximal slacks S−1 and S
−
2 of firm
Figure 4.1: Bilateral comparison of industries
a and the according efficiency. In the upper case the sum of the slacks is
nonzero, therefore a would be inefficient, in the lower case the sum of the
13Remember: With the SBM-model the output-part plays an equally important role,
the input-side is extracted solely for illustrative purposes.
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slacks is zero, i.e. a would be part of the efficiency frontier of industry B and
thus efficient.
The rank-sum test14
The rank-sum test, developed by Wilcoxon, Mann and Whitney, is used to
identify whether the differences between two groups are significant. In or-
der to perform it, the sequence of ordered efficiencies C of all firms (i. e.
in both industries), obtained as described in the previous section, is taken
and ranked in descending order to get the sequence R. If two or more
firms exhibit identical efficiencies, their rank is determined by the sum of
their position in C divided by the amount of tied companies. So, for ex-
ample, if C = {1, 1, 0.89, 0.67, 0.67, 0.56, . . .} the corresponding ranks are
R = {1.5, 1.5, 3, 4.5, 4.5, 6, . . .}. Following that, the rank-sum S of one of the
two groups is calculated. In the present case this would be the group of elec-
tricity enterprises. This statistic, S, is approximately normally distributed
with mean m(m+ n+ 1)/2 and variance mn(m+ n+ 1)/12, where m is the
number of enterprises of the chosen group and n is the number of enterprises
in the other group. The normalization of S leads to
T =
S −m(m+ n+ 1)/2√
mn(m+ n+ 1)/12
, (4.6)
where T has an approximately standard normal distribution. Using T , the
null hypothesis that the two groups have the same population can be checked
at significance-level α. There is a clear conjecture that the electricity enter-
prises are more efficient, such that a one-sided test suffices. This hypoth-
esis will therefore be rejected if T ≤ −Tα, where −Tα corresponds to the
lower percentile of the standard normal distribution. This test, attributed to
Wilcoxon, is essentially equivalent to the Mann-Whitney test.
Having specified the methodology, it can now be proceeded to the empirical
part of the paper.
14This section is largely taken from (Cooper et al., 2000, p. 200 f.).
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4.4 The data
As indicated in section 4.3.3, to get the expert-opinions, questionnaires were
compiled according to the principles of the AHP, such that a proband merely
has to indicate as to how relevant he or she regards each of the 6 selected
financial ratios15 relative to every other selected output-ratio16. These ques-
tionnaires were sent out to the relevant people in the credit-departments
of five major Austrian banks17. Using the AHP-technique, the replies were
mapped into the following table of normalized weights.
Expert Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 3 Ratio 4 Ratio 5 Ratio 6
Expert 1 0.049 0.212 0.115 0.553 0.019 0.053
Expert 2 0.238 0.040 0.098 0.024 0.364 0.236
Expert 3 0.159 0.086 0.040 0.477 0.124 0.113
Expert 4 0.154 0.061 0.325 0.019 0.398 0.044
Expert 5 0.092 0.022 0.137 0.394 0.052 0.304
Table 4.2: Actual table of normalized weights
From this table the upper and lower bounds for the P - and Q-matrices were
calculated as described in section 4.3.3.
The data for the financial ratios was collected from the 2006-annual reports
of 22 “important” European electric utilities and 20 “important” European
telecom-services providers. The selection of these samples was guided by
two principles: comprehensiveness and randomness. The second principle is
particularly important as the less theory-laden the selection, the bigger will
be the explanatory power of the test of differences between the electricity-
and the telecom industries. This “naive” approach led to samples of electric
utilities and telecom-service providers that comprise the big pan-European
players as well as more local smaller companies, diversified companies as well
as companies that concentrate only on parts of the value chain.
15Only the output-ratios as listed in section 4.3.2 had to be compared, since I have only
one input-ratio.
16So, in total, 15 questions had to be answered.
17I sincerely want to thank Friedrich Urbanek for helping me in this issue.
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4.5 The results
Table 4.3 shows the main results of running (4.5) with the above described
data.
Rank Company Industry Efficiency Ref. Set
1.5 Belgacom T 1.00E+00 AXPO AG
1.5 TeliaSonera T 1.00E+00 AXPO AG
3 AXPO AG E 5.06E-01 Belgacom, TeliaS
4 Verbund E 1.19E-01 TeliaSonera
5 CEZ AS E 1.12E-01 TeliaSonera
6 Vodafone T 1.47E-02 AXPO AG
7 Scottish Power E 1.13E-02 TeliaSonera
8 Vattenfall Europe AG E 7.37E-03 Belgacom, TeliaS
9 ATEL AG E 5.94E-03 TeliaSonera
10 Swisscom T 5.79E-03 AXPO AG
11 Telenor T 5.65E-03 AXPO AG
12 Red Electrica De Espana E 5.43E-03 TeliaSonera
13 KPN T 3.99E-03 AXPO AG
14 Hafslund ASA E 3.31E-03 Belgacom, TeliaS
15 EON AG E 2.98E-03 TeliaSonera
16 National Grid E 2.85E-03 TeliaSonera
17 Scottish&Southern E 2.81E-03 TeliaSonera
18 Vivendi Universal T 2.44E-03 AXPO AG
19 ELIA E 2.23E-03 Belgacom, TeliaS
20 Endesa E 2.17E-03 TeliaSonera
21 Electrabel SA E 2.15E-03 TeliaSonera
22 ENEL E 2.11E-03 Belgacom, TeliaS
23 Iberdrola SA E 2.05E-03 TeliaSonera
24 OTE T 2.05E-03 AXPO AG
25 Telekom Austria T 1.59E-03 AXPO AG
26 Electricite de France E 1.47E-03 Belgacom
27 Matav T 1.33E-03 AXPO AG
28 EVN E 1.33E-03 Belgacom, TeliaS
29 EnBW E 1.21E-03 TeliaSonera
30 Portugal Telecom T 1.13E-03 AXPO AG
31 TDC T 1.00E-03 AXPO AG
32 Telecom Italia T 9.96E-04 AXPO AG
33 RWE E 9.02E-04 Belgacom
34 Suez SA E 6.87E-04 Belgacom, TeliaS
35 Telefonica T 6.06E-04 AXPO AG
36 BT T 5.13E-04 AXPO AG
37 TPSA (Poland) T 5.04E-04 AXPO AG
38 France Telecom-Orange T 3.61E-04 AXPO AG
39 Deutsche Telekom T 2.94E-04 AXPO AG
40 Cable&Wireless T 1.87E-04 AXPO AG
41 Svyazinvest 2005 T 1.37E-04 AXPO AG
42 Public Power Corp (Greece) E 9.87E-05 TeliaSonera
Table 4.3: Ranking of efficiencies
Here, the first column is equivalent with R from section 4.3.4, the third
column shows to what industry the respective enterprise belongs to, the
fourth column shows the efficiency of the respective enterprise (i. e. its
relative credit-worthiness) and the fifth column shows its reference set, i. e.
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the enterprises that are its closest neighbors on the efficiency frontier.
From table 4.3 the S-statistic of the electricity industry can be calculated:
407. Plugging this into (4.6), together withm = 22 (the number of electricity
companies) and n = 20 (the number of telecom companies), yields
T = −1.662.
According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test, described in section 4.3.4,
the null hypothesis that the telecom and the electricity industries have the
same population can therefore be rejected at α = 0.05 since −T0.05 = −1.644.
In other words, the electricity industry on the whole indeed has a significantly
lower credit-default risk than the telecom industry.
4.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to add evidence to the controversial question
whether there is a significant difference in the credit default risk of the elec-
tricity and the telecom industry. Realizing that the conventional methods
to measure the credit default risk of enterprises based on financial ratios can
hardly be employed to answer this particular question and that, on the other
hand, its basic conception makes it well applicable to this field, a DEA-based
method was developed by which the credit default risk of industries can be
compared.
This method consists of the following 2 main steps:
First, the relative credit-worthiness of each firm is assessed with a slack-based
measure of efficiency (SBM) DEA-model where financial ratios that should
be as small as possible play the role of inputs and financial ratios that should
be as big as possible play the role of outputs. The SBM-model is modified
compared to the original one so that it is able to incorporate expert-opinions
on the permissible relative sizes of the various in- and outputs and to make
bilateral comparison of industries possible.
Second, the thus obtained efficiencies of all enterprises are ranked and a rank-
sum test is performed to test the hypothesis that the two groups belong to
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the same population.
The application of this method to the data of 22 representative European
electric utilities and 20 representative European telecom service providers led
to a clear rejection of this hypothesis so that it can firmly be stated that the
electricity industry is, on average, characterized by a lower credit default risk
than the telecom industry.
Bibliography
Ai, C., S. Martinez, and D. M. Sappington (2004, November). Incentive
regulation and telecommunications service quality. Journal of Regulatory
Economics 26 (3), 263–285.
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the predic-
tion of corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance 23 (4), 589–609.
Amirteimoori, A. (2006, October). Data envelopment analysis in dynamic
framework. Applied Mathematics and Computation 181 (1), 21–28.
Armstrong, M. and D. E. M. Sappington (2007). Recent developments in the
theory of regulation. In M. Armstrong and R. H. Porter (Eds.), Handbook
of Industrial Organization: Vol. 3, Chapter 27, pp. 1557–1687. Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing.
Averch, H. and L. L. Johnson (1962). Behavior of the firm under regulatory
constraint. The American Economic Review 52 (5), 1052–1069.
Baldwin, R. and M. Cave (1999). Understandin Regulation: Theory, Strategy,
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Banerjee, A. (2003, June). Does incentive regulation ‘cause’ degradation of
retail telephone service quality? Information Economics and Policy 15 (2),
243–269.
Beaver, W. H. (1966). Financial ratios as predictors of failure. Journal of
Accounting Research 4, 71–102.
78
BIBLIOGRAPHY 79
Blochlinger, A. and M. Leippold (2006, March). Economic benefit of powerful
credit scoring. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (3), 851–873.
Bogner, S. and M. Rammerstorfer (2007). Methods and pitfalls in calculating
the wacc for regulated utilities. In M. Rammerstorfer (Ed.), Investment in
regulated markets - a selection of several issues, Wien, Wirtschaftsuniv.,
Diss., 2007. Vienna: Vienna University of Economics and Business Admin-
istration.
Buehler, S., D. Gaertner, and D. Halbheer (2006, July). Deregulating net-
work industries: dealing with price-quality tradeoffs. Journal of Regulatory
Economics 30 (1), 99–115.
Buehler, S., A. Schmutzler, and M. A. Benz (2004, February). Infrastructure
quality in deregulated industries: is there an underinvestment problem?
International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2), 253–267.
Bundesnetzagentur (2006). Entwurf des berichtes der bundesnetzaagentur
nach § 112a enwg zur einfu¨hrung der anreizregulierung nach § 21a enwg.
Technical report, Bundesnetzagentur.
Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes (1978, November). Measuring
the efficiency of decision making units. European Journal of Operational
Research 2 (6), 429–444.
Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes (1979, July). Measuring the
efficiency of decision-making units. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 3 (4), 339+.
Cielen, A., L. Peeters, and K. Vanhoof (2004, April). Bankruptcy predic-
tion using a data envelopment analysis. European Journal of Operational
Research 154 (2), 526–532.
Clements, M. E. (2004). Local telephone quality-of-service: a framework and
empirical evidence. Telecommunications Policy 28 (5-6), 413–426.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 80
Cooper, W., L. Seiford, and K. Tone (2000). Data Envelopment Analysis: a
comprehensive text with models, applications, references, and DEA-Solver
software. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Dimitras, A. I., R. Slowinski, R. Susmaga, and C. Zopounidis (1999, April).
Business failure prediction using rough sets. European Journal of Opera-
tional Research 114 (2), 263–280.
Dimitras, A. I., S. H. Zanakis, and C. Zopounidis (1996, May). A survey of
business failures with an emphasis on prediction methods and industrial
applications. European Journal of Operational Research 90 (3), 487–513.
Dro¨ttboom, M. (1996). Regulierung natu¨rlicher Monopole unter
Beru¨cksichtigung der Produktqualita¨t. Verlag Dr. Kovac.
Dyckhoff, H. and K. Allen (2001, July). Measuring ecological efficiency with
data envelopment analysis (dea). European Journal of Operational Re-
search 132 (2), 312–325.
Edvardsen, D. F. and F. R. Forsund (2003, October). International bench-
marking of electricity distribution utilities. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics 25 (4), 353–371.
Emel, A. B., M. Oral, A. Reisman, and R. Yolalan (2003). A credit scoring
approach for the commercial banking sector. Socio-Economic Planning
Sciences 37, 103–123.
Emrouznejad, A. and E. Thanassoulis (2005, January). A mathematical
model for dynamic efficiency using data envelopment analysis. Applied
Mathematics and Computation 160 (2), 363–378.
Fare, R., S. Grosskopf, C. A. K. Lovell, and C. Pasurka (1989). Multilateral
productivity comparisons when some outputs are undesirable: A nonpara-
metric approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics 71 (1), 90–98.
Fare, R., S. Grosskopf, and R. Russel (1998). Index Numbers: Essays in
Honour of Sten Malmquist. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
Fare, R., S. Grosskopf, and D. Tyteca (1996, August). An activity analysis
model of the environmental performance of firms–application to fossil-fuel-
fired electric utilities. Ecological Economics 18 (2), 161–175.
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive efficency. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society Series A 170.
Forsund, F. R. and S. A. C. Kittelsen (1998). Productivity development
of norwegian electricity distribution utilities. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics 20, 207–224.
Giannakis, D., T. Jamasb, and M. Pollitt (2005, November). Benchmarking
and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the uk
electricity distribution networks. Energy Policy 33 (17), 2256–2271.
Grasto, K. (1997). Incentive-based regulation of electricity monopolies in
norway - background, principles and directives, implementation and con-
trol system. Technical report, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate (NVE).
Growitsch, C., T. Jamasb, and M. Pollitt (2005). Quality of service, effi-
ciency and scale in network industries: An analysis of european electricity
distribution. Technical report, University of Cambridge.
Haber, A. and A. R. Dara (2005, December). Qualita¨tsregulierung - theorie
und internationale erfahrungen.
Hjalmarsson, L. and A. Veiderpass (1992, June). Efficiency and ownership
in swedish electricity retail distribution. Journal of Productivity Analy-
sis 3 (1), 7–23.
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt (2000, September). Benchmarking and regulation:
international electricity experience. Utilities Policy 9 (3), 107–130.
Katz, M. L. and H. S. Rosen (1998). Microeconomics (Third ed.). Boston,
Mass: Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 82
Kidokoro, Y. (2002). The effects of regulatory reform on quality. Journal of
the Japanese and International Economies 16 (1), 135–146.
Kinnunen, K. (2003). Network Pricing in the Nordic Countries - An Empir-
ical Analysis of the Local Electricity Distribution Utilities Efficiency and
Pricing. Ph. D. thesis, Carl von Ossietzky Universita¨t Oldenburg.
Knieps, G. (2003). Entscheidungsorientierte ermittlung der kapitalkosten
in liberalisierten netzindustrien. Zeitschrift fuer Betriebswirtschaft 73 (9),
989–1006.
Korhonen, P. J. and M. J. Syrja¨nen (2003, July). Evaluation of cost efficiency
in finnish electricity distribution. Annals of Operations Research 121 (1),
105–122.
Kridel, D. J., D. E. Sappington, and D. L. Weisman (1996). The effects of
incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey. Journal
of Regulatory Economics 9 (3), 269–306.
Kwoka, J., S. Ozturk, and M. Pollitt (2007). Divestiture, vertical integra-
tion, and efficiency: An exploratory analysis of electric power distribution.
In Conference Proceedings of the 34th Conference in Valencia. European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE).
Littlechild, S. (1983). Regulation of British Telecommunications profitability.
London: HMSO.
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. Oxon: Routledge.
Maniadakis, N. and E. Thanassoulis (2004). A cost malmquist productivity
index. European Journal of Operational Research 154 (2), 396–409.
Mateo, F., T. Coelli, and C. O’Donnell (2006, July). Optimal paths and
costs of adjustment in dynamic dea models: With application to chilean
department stores. Annals of Operations Research 145 (1), 211–227.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
Nemoto, J. and M. Goto (1999, July). Dynamic data envelopment analysis:
modeling intertemporal behavior of a firm in the presence of productive
inefficiencies. Economics Letters 64 (1), 51–56.
Nemoto, J. and M. Goto (2003). Measurement of dynamic efficency in pro-
duction: An application of data envelopment analysis to japanese electric
utilities. Journal of Productivity analysis 19, 191–210.
Ouellette, P. and V. Vierstraete (2004, May). Technological change and
efficiency in the presence of quasi-fixed inputs: A dea application to the
hospital sector. European Journal of Operational Research 154 (3), 755–
763.
Paradi, J. C., M. Asmild, and P. C. Simak (2004). Using dea and worst prac-
tice dea in credit risk evaluation. Journal of Productivity Analysis 21 (2).
Pollitt, M. (1995). Ownership and Performance in Electric Utilities. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Research (2006). Methoden zur bestimmung der kapitalkosten regulierter un-
ternehmen in europa. Technical report, Research Institute for Regulatory
Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration,
Vienna.
Roycroft, T. R. and M. G. Murrilo (2000, November). Trouble reports as an
indicator of service quality: the influence of competition, technology, and
regulation. Telecommunications Policy 24 (10-11), 947–967.
Saaty, T. L. (1980). Analytic Hierarchy Process. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
Sappington, D. (2005, March). Regulating service quality: A survey. Journal
of Regulatory Economics 27 (2), 123–154.
Sappington, D. E. (2003). The effects of incentive regulation on retail
telephone service quality in the united states. Review of Network Eco-
nomics 2 (4), 355–375.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 84
Sengupta, K. (1995). Dynamics of Data Envelopment Analysis. London:
Dordrecht.
Simak, P. C. (1997). Dea based analysis of corporate failure. Master’s thesis,
Center for Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship, University
of Toronto.
Sueyoshi, T. and K. Sekitani (2005, March). Returns to scale in dynamic
dea. European Journal of Operational Research 161 (2), 536–544.
Ter-Martiroysan, A. (2003). The effects of incentive regulation on quality of
service in electricity markets. Technical report, Department of Economics
- George Washington University.
Troutt, M. D., A. Rai, and A. Zhang (1996, April). The potential use of
dea for credit applicant acceptance systems. Comput. Oper. Res. 23 (4),
405–408.
Varian, H. R. (1985). Price discrimination and social welfare. The American
Economic Review 75 (4), 870–875.
von Hischhausen, C., A. Cullmann, and A. Kappeler (2006). Efficiency analy-
sis of german electricity distribution utilities. Applied Economics 38, 2553–
2566.
Waterson, M. (1988). Regulation of the Firm and Natural Monopoly. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Weston, J. F. and E. F. Bringham (1993). Essentials of managerial finance.
Orlando: Dryden Press.
Yaisawarng, S. and J. D. Klein (1994, August). The effects of sulfur dioxide
controls on productivity change in the us electric power industry. Review
of Economics and Statistics LXXVI (3), 447–460.
